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Abs t r ac t
Because c u r rent a f f a irs form an impor tant pa rt of t he social
s t udies cu rriculum i n h igh school , i t was de c ide d to attempt to a s s es s
t he amoun t of b ias which mig h t be fo un d in t he resou rce mat eri als (n ews -
pape rs) which we re be lieve d t o be use d fo r t h is p urpos e . Th rough a
sampling p rocess , the Daily News and the Evenin g Te legram of St . John's
and the Globe & Hail of To ronto were chosen as sample news p ape rs and the
Yom Kippur War of 1973 was chosen as the sample event t o s tudy fo r bias .
Fou r t ype s of ana lyses we re conducte d- -one of r e li ability, one of he ad -
l ine s , one of column-inches , and one of illus trat ions.
The Globe & Ma il showe d meas u r ab le b ias i n the s ame di rect i on on
each o f the fo ur analys es . Al though t he Ev en ing Te l eg ram an d the~
News show ed statistically significant b ias on only one measure, the
Daily News showed b ias i n t h e same direct i on on a l l f our analyses, and
t he Evenin g Te le g ram s howed bias i n the same di rection on three of the
fou r analyses. Besides this, many of t he accounts were l ack i n g in
essential details. Consequently, it was concluded that a teacher using
one source as resource material fo r c urrent events woul d be dep rivin g
students of essential inf ormat i on . I t was r e cceeende d that the teache r
at tempt to find a variety o f r e s ource mat erials a nd attempt t o t each
stude nt s t o r e c ogn i ze cODJDOnly used t e chn i que s of imp lanting b ias.
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Chap te r 1
Introduction
In recent years there has been increasing emphasis in high
school. especially in social studies and language arts, on cu rrent
infonnation dnvojvfng con troversial situa tions. In many cases educato rs
have ve rbalized the r ation ale for bringing con t roversial cu r ren t events
i nto t he cur ricul um withou t giving s uff icient attention to t he so urces
of information they are using (Hodge tts , 1968 ; Levin, 19 72 ; Massialas &
Sprague , 1974). The major concern of this study is to investigate bias
in the content of newspaper sources that are cceecnty used in current
events programs in Newfoundland high schools .
Newspapers, as opposed to other media. were chosen fo r the study
for three main reasons. First. newspapers give day to day reactions to
events as opposed to magazines which are published less frequently,
giving the magazine writers time to react in the light of later inci-
dents. Secondly, newspapers a re readily available to mos t Newfound land
high schools . Thirdly, o n the basis of two studies of Canadian use of
the media, i t might be concluded t hat newspapers are used in the study
of current events. Hodgetts ( 1968) poin ted out that current events
teachers in Canadian schools used "topics t o rn f rom the pages of the
morning newspaper" (p , 31). La te r, in 1970, Martin Goldfarb Consultants
made another pertinent conclusion, while studying public opinion of the
mass media for the Special Senate Committee on Mass Media. These con-
sultants, in the Report of the Special Senate Committee on Mass Media ,
Vol. III (1970 , pp , 3-183) , state: " Fo r facts, background and interpre-
tation, people are more inclined to rely on newspapers than on televi-
e Lon , radio, or magazines" (p , 5) .
There would appear to be inherent dangers in bringing a newspaper
into the classroom and studying and discussing its text as factual. If
the newspaper does not carry sufficient data on the various opposing
sides in a controversy , the students who depend on it as their only
source of information will not have sufficient data to make a competent
judgment .
Ra t i on al e for Current Materials
The philosophy for bringing more controversial current materials
into the curriculum might be considered to understand more fully the
rationale for this study. There are several commonly stated reasons.
First , in modern society a person can be confronted wi th such masses of
information and quickly changing circumstances that it is possible to
become disoriented , and incapable of making rational judgments. This
phenomenon has been pointed out by Toffler (1970). The Report of the
SpeCial Senate Committee on Mass Media, Vol. I (1970) comments on how a
responsible press can he lp to overcome this type of confusion:
Change is the constant of our times, and the media , by defi-
nition , must deal with change--not only through reporting the
isolated, dramatic event , but by probing the hidden shifts in
attitudes and institutions by which most change is accom-
plished. To insist t h a t t his is the media's main job is not
to suggest any built-in bias for or against the notion of
"progress." A new pulp lllill on the edge of town mayor may
not be "progress;" but it is definitely change. The media 's
job is to bring forward as many facts, as many informed judg-
ments on that change as possible. (p , 85)
Secondly, it lllight be assumed that instant communication with
all pa rts of the world would give illllDediate understanding of other
people and societies. However . this is not consis tent with conclusions
made by many r e s earchers in the field of human pe rcep tion (Cohen. 1966 ,
pp , 13 3- 145; Postman & Weingar tne r . 196 9 . Chap t . 6). It is widely
believe d that people tend t o see i n te ree o f what; they ha ve kn own, wh a t
is fami lia r t o the m. Li ppmann (1966, pp , 6 7-75) describes this figu r a-
tive ly by q uo t ing a dis tinguished ar t crit ic. The ar t c r itic demon-
st rates that we , as untrained observe rs , seeing a new t ype of a rt at temp t
to lIIOuld:
wha tever we l ook a t into the foI'lllS bo r rowed from t he one ar t
wi th which we a re acquainted . The re i s ou r s tandard of
art is t i c r e a lity . Le t anyone give us s hapes and co lors which
we cannot instantly match i n our paltry s tock of hackneyed
rores and tints , and we shake our heads at his fai lure to
reproduce t hi ngs as we know they certainly are , or we accuse
him o f i nsinc e r ity . (p , 69)
Lippmann points out th at i t i s poss i ble to s ubs t i t u t e the wo r d
" politics" fo r "ar t , " and the s tatement woul d be eq ua l ly t rue. He fee ls
that human be ings a tt empt t o fit new situat ions to p reconceived expec-
tat ions. On the basis of a g reat deal of evidence, i t migh t be concluded
that people's judpents a re highly influenced by wha t they have known in
t he pas t . Not on ly a re their pe rcep tions influe nced i n thi s way. bu t
many social psychologis t s who have s t udied communica tion believe that
they a ct i vely avoid inf ormation which i s i ncons istent wi t h wha t they
be l i ev e , whi l e perce iving inf o rmat i on which is c onsis t e n t (Mil ls , 1969 ,
p, 129 ) . Th is se lect ive exposure implies th e ne c es s ity of e xposi ng
studen ts to a wide range of knowledge i n the hope t hat t h e y w11l no t be
confined to a narrow , provincial point of view as t hey g rov up.
Another support fo r this wide exposure even on such an elemental
l e vel as t he ability t o use language effectively is given by Carney
(1972). He r e fer s t o a s t udy which suggests t hat t h e children of mid dl e
clas s f ami l ies c an handle their thinking wi th mor e ease than wo rk i n g
c l ass ch i l dren b e cause they are e xpos e d t o a wi de r v a rie ty of wor ds , and
that th is gap widens as the chi ld re n g row older. The working class
children , "thus have a nar rowe r view of life 's potentialities- -and t h e i r
own" (p, 96).
I t might be con c luded tha t chi l dre n ne ed t o be expos ed to new
wor ds, new ways of thinking , and nev and di f fe r e n t cu l t u r e s during their
schooling if t he y can be expected to unders tand t he complexi ties of t he
si tuat ions wi th which they are presented daily in life. Start (1974)
dis cus s e s t he r o l e of th e newspaper in thi s area :
Prej ud ices are broken down through s t udies of thi s na t ure as
s t ude nts l e arn about dif fe r en t people an d their philosophi es
of life , a nd are he l pe d to und erstand why peop le live an d
thi nk differently . By s tudying news i tems, edi to rials and
editorial ca rtoons in a r e gul ar and organized progr8Ill, students
will soon become familia r with na t ional leade rs , countries ,
local and world p roblems and philosophies of governments . (p . 5)
Thirdly, if Canada is t o s urvive as a na tion there must be
communica t i on between the various sect o rs about are a s wh e r e t he re is
cont rove rsy (for e xample , French and Engl ish version s of Canadian his-
t ory ) as well as mutual p roblems and goals (Hedge t r s , 1968 : Report of
t he Royal Co'llllll1ssion on Bilingualism and Bicul turalism , 196 3 ; Stamp ,
19 72) . The impo r tance of th e p ress i n conveying t he s e i de as h a s be e n
note d by Bu t le r (1975) :
The imp act of cu ltural f orce s such a s the mass med ia , t he
educa tion system, and t he ar t s in general has long been i de n-
tified as a cen t ra l va riable in t be formation (or non -forma-
t i on) of a clear sense of n a tional identity . (p , 3)
Four th ly, living i n a democ r atic country it is esse nt ial t h at
pe ople have all poss ible i nf o rma tion on an is s ue so they can ch oos e
alternatives in telligently (Huessig . 19 75, pp , 3-43; Schramm , 1966,
pp , 206-2 19). Although it wou ld pe r haps be desi rable t o have all citi-
zens actively involved in the gove rneent , this does not. seem very likely
t.o happen, However. wit.h sufficient education in reflective thinking
through d i s cus s i on of controversial issues. it seems possible for IDOS t.
citizens to be ab le t o make intel l igen t , well-founded j udgmen ts. Newman
and Olive r (1970) say:
the value of rational analysis of controversy does not. rest
solely on i ts possib le con tribution in increasing citizen
activism. Its value lies less perhaps in enhancing participa-
tory powe r , and mor e in dev elop ing intellectual powe r for
courpt ehendf ng the cont rove rs ies t hat impinge upon us. (p , 33)
It has been pointed ou t , however , that the school and the mass
media a re not the only agencies of poli tical socialization. The home
and the pee r group are often identified as among the IOOst powe rful in
many countries . Several studies have poin ted ou t that a numbe r of basic
political a ttitudes and values are established i n the United States by
elementary school age (Dawson & Prewitt , 1969; Greenstein. 1965). Since
Cana dians tend to be influence d to a g reat exten t by American l i t erature .
it mig h t be assumed t hat the same is t rue fo r Canadian children .
However , the re is reason to be lieve this is not so . Pammett (1971)
conducted a study to see if there were any diffe rences in political
socializat ion be twe e n Canadian a nd American children o f t he same age.
He contends . as a r e s ult of his study , that Can adian children become
politically aware at a later age (in early teens) than American, an age
at which the falllily's influence has diminished . He states:
Pa r tisan orientations deve l op s low ly un t il by the t i me t hey
r each Grade 8 ap proxima te ly h alf o f t h e child ren e xp ress a
pa r ty prefe rence . There is little awareness of i s sue s which
divide pa rties. • • • Since many political orientations are
not fotmd in children of elementary school age studied here.
these orientations will either be fo rmed l a t er in l i f e under
t he influence of a genc ies o the r t h an t he pa rents or not be
formed at all. (p. 140 )
The implicat ion of his study would seem to be that it is possible
fo r the s ch ool to playa greater role in t he formation of political
ideas i n Canada than would be t h e case in the Uni t e d St ates. He co n-
cludes as wel l t h a t child r e n ha ve a l ow l e vel of awarenes s of p olit ical
issues because t he s e issues a re not dis cu s s ed in th e h ome o r cOllll'lluni ty .
The r e s pons i b i li t y as a r e s u l t aeees to fa l lon the schoo l t o eake s u re
t h a t illlpOrtant poli tical m.atte ra are discussed and tha t children have
some practice in making political judgments based on sound evidence.
From these fou r f ac t.ora , it would aeem in t heory that studying
controversial c ur rent e ve n ts would be an impo r tan t f actor i n the gener a l
int ellectual de velopment and poli t i ca l socia lization of t he s t ude n t.
However. it mi gh t be ques tione d if a del i berate pr ogram of studying
cont rove rsial cu rrent even ts is ne c e s sary, since t he content ion can be
m.ade tha t students will r e a d. comprehend , an d t hink on t heir own.
Muessig (1 9 75, pp . 3-43), as edi tor fo r the 45 th Ye a r b ook of t he National
Counci l for th e Soc ial Studies , s tates that he:
hopes to deeons r ra re that dealing wi th controversia l issuea
is fa r IIlOre i mpo rtant t h an m.any people in aocial studies
education h ave ye t t o r e aliz e . Wi t ho ut inte nding t o ove rs tate
t h e c ase . a c ruci a l f acet of t he fu ture of c h i ld r en and yo uth.
o f educ a t i on, o f our own so ciety and of t he world is a t s t ake
here. One canno t pre di c t how much time i s l e ft to de velop
r e fle ct i ve pe rsons who c an a ttempt t o improve the huma n co n-
di tion and t o aave mank i nd , but it is a pparen t that we must
be e n ga ge d ser ious ly now in this cr usade . {p , 18)
Further arguments ag a ins t the co n tention t hat s t udents are
capab le of understanding the courplex i s s ue s on their own, can be found
in social psychology i n the field of perception of COllll:lunication. as
well as r e po r t a on educational practices.
Some studies in the area of perception of communication have
implied t hat people are most likely to believe a person who is expert in
the field he or she is discussing who has nothing to gain by proposing a
certain point of view (Hovland , Janis, & Kelley. 1953). For this reason
they contend that newspaper reporters have a lot of credibili ty • As a
support for their contention , they r e f e r to the way that some advertisers
and public relations men take advantage of this credibility. They state:
"That publicity men assume greater credibility wi ll be accorded news
stories as compared with adver tisements is manifested by their repeated
attempts to obtain publicity for clients in the news cctceoe'' (p , 23).
Spears (1970, pp- 187-207) commenta on the influence that news-
paper writing has on most people:
It follows that the influence of the newspaper is enorteous-r-
not because of the packaged opinions of the editorial page in
which editors and publishers tell people what to think , but
because they are reporting to their readers what the world is
like; by selection and presentation are passing on their own
view of it. • • . The printed word carries a mysterious
authority; what we read is t r ue . "All I know," said Will
Rogers , "is what I read in the papers." He spoke for most of
us . (p , 188)
It would seem apparent that students would have a tendency to
believe whatever they read , so it would be possible for a newspaper to
influence their thinking. Coupled with this general tendency to believe
what has been pub lished in a newspaper. it would seem equally true , from
personal observation and consultation with colleagues, that many if not
most teenage students tend to be disinterested in news , particularly
foreign and political news.
Recent comm.unication theory adds further ev idence about the
possible inf luence the media can have on people who have no knowledge
about a particular subject. Martin (1977) refers to r e ce n t contentions
that the media do not tend to change most peoples' opinions (due to
selective exposure). He does note, however, that people who have no
opinion are vulnerable . He states:
when nothing is competing from past experience ••• media
experience becomes real and their values are adopted as one' s
own. "
Theoretically. of course, it La dop t i n g media values 8B
one's own] could happen to people who do not expose them-
selves to many media o r who do not take an interest in poli-
tical iBsues. (p , 130)
The assumption m..ight be made that the tendency to believe any-
thing published and a basic disinterest in Wlderstanding it, give rise
to a potentially dangerous situation, especially in modern society where
the mass media is so pervasive. The possible results of unquestioning
belief have been well portrayed in Orwell's 1984.
Importance of Study
The above discussion would seem to make evident the importance
of the sources of information used in the study of current events .
Unless the students are presented with the "truth" 8B it is seen by
various sides in a controversy. it would not seem possible for these
students to learn to m.ake intelligent, well-founded judgments in a fast
changing, complex society.
The purpose of conducting this study was to demonstrate the type
of bias that can exis t in newspaper accounts. and to under l ine the
fallacy of depending on only one source in the study of current events.
It was felt that if bias could be demonstrated in a sample population of
newspapers, the implication would be that it exists in other newspapers.
The study is conducted by picking sample material from each of three
newspapers: the Globe & Mail, the Evening Telegram, and the Daily News.
The Daily News an d the Eve n i ng Telegram we re chosen b ecause I be y are
local pape r s an d are mos t readily available to the students . Th e Gl ob e
& Mail was chosen as one o f the lar ges t circulation papers in Can ada.
An international ev ent , the Yom Kippur War of 1973 . was chosen
as the sampling event for the study and the sampling period was from
three days before the war for two months. A r endoc sample of 12 days
during that period was chosen .
Each sampl e was subjected to four tests: 1) reliability , 2) pic-
t ures, 3) c olumn- i n che s , and 4) disp lay index . The scores on each of
t h e s e s tudies ve re then tested for significance us fng chi square. Any
score which had a probability of less than . 0 5 was considered to be
statistically significant.
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Chapter 2
Review of Literature
Since Watergate in the United States. t he press has been given a
grea ter status and icportance by some. I t has been placed more strongly
i n the r ole of adversary. digging fo r inforl:tation beyond that which
government officials are willing t o expose. Some cons i de ration might be
given to questioning whether eos t individual newspapers are wor thy of
t h i s new cred ib ility. A review of some of the studies of the Canadian
press conducted In the recent past can be revealing.
Influence of t he AI:leri:.an Pr es s
Pe r h a ps the most c omprehensive of these studies wa s t he Report
o f the Special Senate Com:nit t e e on Mas s Media (19 70). The Special
coeed t t e e of the Senate was a ppointed in 1969 "to consider an d report
up on the ownership and c ontrol of the eejor Illeans of mass public ccceu-
nicati on in Canada," and to examine " t h e i r impact and influence on the
Canadian public" (Terms of Reference). One of its more important s tate-
eenrs rega rded ownership of the press in Canada. The Report states th at
JQOf>t newspapers in Canada are owned b y a fc~ individual comp an Las , Fre e
Pres s, Southan , and Thomson are n amed as the three largest. Among th em
th ey c on t ro l 45 % o f Can a dian ci rculation . It go e s on t o state that:
Using t h is ap proach. we f i nd tha t the 14 n ews pa per groups in
CanaJa b e rv e en thelll own o r hold substantial fnee r e s t i n 77
da il ies wi t h a codJ i ne d c i rculation of 3 ,6 14,354- -about 77
pe r c e nt of t o t al canadtaa daily circulati o n. (\'01. I , p . 20 )
Although Wagenberg and Suderlund (1 9 75) conducted a study which
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demonstrated newspapers in the same newspaper group (that is those with
the same ownership) do not necessarily have the same editorial leanings,
there is the ever present danger that one of these groups could use its
tremendous influence to create public opinion on important issues. They
say :
That the overconcentration of power in any sector of
society is cause for concern Is a well-worn maxim for those
who value democratic noras • At present there is no way of
ensuring that those who own large segments of the Canadian
newspaper industry will not use that power to mould Canadian
opinion to their own advantage. (p , 98)
Of the chain groups discussed, the Report of the Special Senate
Committee on Hass Media (1970) appears to be most critical of the
Thomson group. The Report seemed to imply that all Thomson papers were
inferior at the time of the study . Keeping in mind that the Evening
Telegram is a Thomson paper, the necessity of broadening the scope of
Newfoundland students from just that one paper gains more importance.
The Report is critical of Canadian papers for buying cheaper
syndicated American columnists' works, re-printing cartoons from other
papers, and not having enough news staff, instead relying on wire
services for a great deal of their material. Douglas Fisher, well-known
syndicated political columnist, is quoted about an interview he conducted
with the late Lord Thomson:
Would he consider having my column bought or that of George
Bain or Peter Newman bought for the News Chronicle. my point
being that I thought the interpretation of Ottawa politics was
covered rather slightly considering the high political interest
in the area? The answers were: "Port Arthur is a dandy, one
of the best profit makers in our Canadian operations, and I
got a great deal on the building from the federal government ."
The second answer went: "Frankly. what would be the point of
it? It wouldn't sell one eo re paper in the market area."
(Vol. I, p , 64)
As a rule the Report has unfavourable corenenta about the attitude
12
of the media towards spending money. In spite of having higher rates of
profit than most other businesses in the country. the media owners at
that time (according to the report) were unwilling to put much of their
money into improving the quality of their productions.
The area in which there Is possibly the greatest failing is in
relying too much on wire sources for information; although, as the Report
points out : "small papers need CP most. and benefit most from it. The
point was made clearly by J. R. H. Sutherland, publisher of the New
Glasgow News which has a circulation under to,OOO ." Mr . Sutherland is
quoted as saying:
Because of cp . the New Glasgow News can have the same news
report as is provided for much larger papers in Sidney and
Halifax and Saint John and Moncton and Quebec and Montreal ,
and so on across Canada. (Vol. I, p , 231).
The fault may be said then to lie not with the idea of having a
Canadian wire service which collects information from all parts of
Canada and the world , and distributes that information to newspapers in
all parts of the cou ntry. The trouble apparent ly lies with the method
of operation , particularly in Cpls reliance on AP. Butler (1975) points
out in his paper:
The AP-CP agreement is a straightforward business arrange-
ment. with some advantages accruing to both agencies. In
addition to receiving Canadian news th rough the services of
CP, the annual cash payment received by AP serves to lower the
assessments for the U.S. members of the Associated Press. For
its part. Canadian Press acquires an i nternational news ser-
vice albeit n ot a Canadian one , at a fraction of the cost of
sending more Canadian correspondents ab road. The result is
that with the exception of infrequent stories filed by the few
Canadian correspondents presently active internationally. an
extremely high proportion of what Canadians read and hear
about the rest of the world originates directly or indirectly
with the Associated Press. (pp . 7-8)
If the American news copy were clearly marked with the AP byline.
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t he situation would not be so disturbing. but he goes on to say:
In a ddi t i on to the AP wi re copy that is reproduced ve rbatim by
Can a di an newspapers. much of the CP international reporting is
based upon AP reports that ar e received in CP's New York
office and after mi nor e diti ng , a re sent ou t to Can adian news-
papers unde r the CP byline . Thus. much of what passes for
Canadi an internation a l r e po r t ing, in fact originates wi th and
Is la rgely wri t ten by AP. (p , 9)
It might eas i ly be said, to quote Scanlon (1974): "Canada sees
the wor ld through US eyes" (p , 34) . The extent of the p rob lem can be
realized by l ook i n g a t eo me of the co n tent analysis described by But ler
(1975). He fo un d that of t he Evening Te legram to tal of f ore i gn news
stories . 30% came from CP and 53% c ame from AP--a grand total of 83 % of
foreign news which may have be en di rectly or indirectly influenced by
the American viewpoint. Of the five papers studied (the Evening Te le-
..8.!:!!!. the Montreal St a r . t he Globe I) Mail . t he Edmonton Journal , and t he
Va n couv e r Sun) , the Evening Telegram percen tage was the highest; how-
ever, t he ave r a ge was 13% by CP and 36% by AP, for a grand to tal of 49 %.
When o ther United States news agencies are included i n this t o t a l , the
average fo r t h e f ive newspape rs in t h e study becomes 67 % possibly i nf lu-
enced by the American viewpoint (p , 14).
Anothe r disturbing f act about the coverage of news in the
Evening Telegram was brought out by Cahill (1971) in a study she con-
ducted of three Can adian papers (the Evening Te legram , t he Globe I) Mai l .
and t he Halifax Chronicle-Herald). She found t ha t 46 .6 % of the news i n
t h e Evening Telegram was inte rnational ; whe n this is added t o the 1. 9%
dealing with Canadian/U.S . relations , a total of 50.5% of the Evening
Te legram was devoted to foreign news. Keeping in mind t hat 83 % of t his
possib ly comes e i t her direct ly or indirect ly f rom U.S. sources , it can
be seen how much the Evening Te legram news can be influenced by U.S .
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opinions. There would seem to be two implications about the Evening
Telegram from these studies. First. it Is presenting less national news
than the other papers which were studied. Gordon (1966) tends to con-
finn this contention, since he found, out of the fifteen Canadian news-
papers he used in his study. the Evening Telegram devoted the lowest
number of column-inches to national news. Secondly, they are cutting
local reporters and depending on wire service copy in order to increase
their profits. The dangers of this situation are pointed out in the
Report of the Special Senate Coumittee on Mass Media (1970). when they
plead for "better" information on international affairs:
By better in this context, we simply mean more Canadian
•••• no amount of tinkering with AP copy in Cp's New York
office will give it a Canadian character. An American
reporter. writing for an AlPerican audience, writes in the
American idiom, which is not yet the Canadian idiom. He
writes from a background of American experience and American
national interest. which are not the Canadian experience and
the Canadian interest. He uses American illustrations which
are not Canadian illustrations , and he draws on a literature,
a history. and a political tradition which are h is and not
ours.
Every reporter has a bias. We think it is immensely
important that reporters who give us our picture of the world
should reflect the kind of bias that Canadians tend to share,
rather than the bias that Americans or Frenchmen or Englishmen
tend to share. (Vol. 1. pp , 233-234)
In summary. several conclusions can be reached from the research
conducted on the llledia in Canada. One central factor is that Canadians.
including students in school , look to the newspaper "for facts . back-
ground , and interpretation" of the news (Report of the Special Senate
Committee on Mass Media , Vol. Ill, 1970). This dependence on newspapers,
coupled with the strong evidence that people who are uninformed in poli-
tical affairs have a tendency to believe what they read (Hartin . 1977),
implies that students should not be subjected to studying the information
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contained in one news p a pe r .
The difficulty of finding a single newspaper which is a reliable
and unbiased news source among Canadian newspapers. according to the
studies which have been carried out , would seem to be readily apparent .
Many Canadian newspapers are owned by large chains . and t her e f or e a r e
subject to the dangers of being influenced to pub lish biased news by t he
owners . Als o , this chain ownership has the danger of bringing a type of
uniform editorial set-up which makes the ne wspape rs suffer from a bland
sameness . Canadian newspaper publishers , too , are often more inte res ted
in making a big profi t th an i n turning out a product that is accep table
un de r s trong standar ds of j udgmen t.
In orde r to economize . publishers want their editors to rely
eo r e heavily on wire service s tories , in order to cut the cost of
employing, in the case of small pape rs, competent local s taff , or in t h e
case of large papers . national or inte rnational staff. For this r e a s on,
Canadian newspap ers are highly i nflue nc ed by t he reporting of CP. which
is in t u r n influenced by AP.
Since t he inf luence of the American wire services on Canadian
newspapers has been documented (Butler , 1975; Cahill , 1971; Hart, 1963.
Scanlon, 1968 , 1969 , 1974) . a brief review of recent studies of the
American press would seem to be necessary. Because of t his high Amer ican
co n t ent , it might be assumed that the view of the world con tained in t he
Canadian p ress would be similar to that of t h e American press . Some
idea of t his wor ld view has been assembled in a s tudy by Ge r bn e r and
Marvanyi (1977) . In comp aring the United States Pr e s s to t hat of several
other countries (not including Canada) by content a na l y s i s, they con-
c luded tha t the Unite d States gave l e s s a ttention to t h e outside wor ld
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than any other of the ccunt rt.es surveyed, including the Soviet Union and
Eastern European count ries (p, 56). They also s tate t h a t the American
Pr ess gave great emphasis to ce rt ain a r e as of t he worl d to t h e excl usion
of others. They point out :
Looking a t t he world of U.S. newspapers, we can see t ha t
foreign news events happening in Western Europe , Sou th Asia
and the Fa r East, North America , and the Middle East (includ-
ing Is r ael) . make up two - thirds of t he U.S. f ore i gn n ews map
of t he wor Ld, The war in Vie tnam made that small r e g i on loom
large r than all o f Afric a and Chin a ccee tne d, The Mideast an d
Israe l attra cted tOOre at t en t ion th an the Sov ie t Union p lus
Eastern Eu rope . (pp. 5 7-58)
Fu r ther confirmation of causes for concern is exp ressed by Martin
(1977) who points ou t t h a t the news media provide "the facts, for the
mos t part , t h a t make up t he cognitive world of e ach individual" (p. 130).
He goe s on t o sta t e that th e ne ws med i a doe s not mer e l y r eact t o ev en ts
which are most promi nen t , b ut t h a t it actual ly es tab lishes certain
issues t o emphas ize. He says:
This agenda-setting power of the press is di rective rather
than r e a c t i ve . The p ress does no t mere ly r e f l e c t developments
....hich als o influe nce the general pub lic in the same ....ay . The
p ress a c tual l y p icks ce r t a i n i s sue s t o p l ay up at times t hat
do no t ne ce s sarily paral l e l the signi f icance of those eve n ts.
(p. 120 )
Ea rlier s tudies by Lindley (1974), Snide r (1967) , and White
(1950) had r e s e a r che d ....ha t news wire editors decide to print and why.
They found t h a t the published news was based on two factors primarily:
1) t he b u dge t l i st, t hat is , a list of ma jor s t or ies e xpected t o be
filed in a given cycle, sen t ou t by t he individua l wire services , and
2) the subjective opinion of t he wi re edito rs . Lindley (1974) concludes
t hat these wi re editors have little contact wi. th general public opinion ,
an d t here f ore, do not tend to be responsive to pub lic tas tes or needs.
The i r findings seem t o serve as f urthe r evidence fo r Hartin's (1 97 7)
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Graber (1976) . i n discussing the issues emphasized in two recent
elections in the United States , draws a similar conclusion about the Yay
the Press established the issues for the campaigns. She states:
Judging f rom content analysis of press and television
informat ion in two r ecent ele c t i ons . a nd f r om gen e r a l obse r -
vation of o t her elec tions in t h e te l e vi s i on era, i t eeees
clear t ha t eedt e a udiences receive most i n fonnation about
gene ral human qualities of candidates rather tban about their
professional qualifications . As for issues. the media stress
the excitement of campaign skirmishes . instead of dwelling on
the manifold probletDS facing t he country and the merits of
t he so lutions p ro posed or i gno r e d by the candidates . (p , 301)
She goes on to poi nt out t he dangers of t his type of emphas is :
These information supply patterns. which are characteris-
tic of press and television th roughout the nation. encourage
electoral choices on the basis of personality characteristics
of t h e contenders. Al though the re was ample information on a
l i mite d number of issues, the heavy stress by t he media on
o t he r t ypes o f data made issues appear ins ignificant by co te-
pa rd sen, (p , 30 1)
Applying these findings to the Canadian press. the expectation
would be first. that Canadian papers would stress similar events and
show similar bias to the Americ an pape rs. Again the s t ud ies by Scanlon
(1968. 1969 . 19 74) t end to confirm this conten tion . Secondly , it wou l d
be reasonable to assume that Canadian newspapers would concentrate on
similar issues in a federal election to those of the American presiden-
tial elections . The findings of seeee t c , LaDue , Jensen, and Clarke
(1977). in a s t udy of t he issues in the 1974 f e de ral election , again
t e nd t o agree wi th t his premise. They identified one of the th ree major
issues in the election as leadership. Canadians were asked to choose
between the leaders of t h e t wo major national parties. This was r ather
incongruent in t h e Canadian government system where Prime Ministe rs are
not directly e lected. but receive thst position as the l e a der of the
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pa r ty with the IDOst sea ts i n the House of COIllllODS. if they can lllain tain
the confidence of a majori ty of meci>ers.
These studies tend to show that t he Press does not reach the
standards which llIa1\Y observers contend it should. Yet. attempting to
def ine th e s tandard i t oug ht to meet; and to attemp t to measure I f an
i ndivi du a l pa per r eaches this s tan da r d i s a difficul t and multifaceted
p roble m. However . one aspect o f t he Press seems to be an implicit p a r t
of all t h e s e studies . and that Is b ias. As a result some conside ration
might be given to the question of defining and measuring bias.
Role of Individual Reporter
Pe rhaps the role of the i n divi dua l repor ter c an be discussed
fi rst. In t h e post-Watergat e e ra, co nc e pts of t he functi on of the
r e porter are in the p roces s of chang i n g . An ana lysis of i de as rega r din g
the role of t he reporte r r e veals there are two e xtreme opinions: one
which sees the reporte r as an objective . fact oriented observe r making
eve ry a t tempt to present all sides of an i s s ue ( the objec tive repor ter)
and the o ther which defines the reporte r as a participant, analyzing the
news and i nte rpreting i ts significance (the investigative repor te r)
(Starck & Soloski , 19 77).
The concep t of invest i gat i ve r eporting imp lies th a t an indivi dua l
r e porter who signs th e arti cl e wi ll se a r ch ou t a l l t he in f o rma tion on a
given s ubject asking qu estions, and seeking until he or she can a rrive
at "the t r uth" on the basis of the evidence . Because t he wr iter is
placing his or her own interpretation on the available evidence, inves-
tigative r e port i ng might be confused with biased r e port i ng. However.
the re is anothe r way of viewing inves tigative r e po r t i n g . Since t he
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reporter's views are clearly expressed and his or her judgments were
made through a study of the whole situation. it can be seen as similar
to editorial commentary .
Definition of Bias
Bias is defined as attempting to present a particular opinion
without openly stating that it is opinion. The following statement
which was part of the Report of the Royal Commission on the Press in
Britain (1947-1949) was found to most closely comply to the concept of
the Press this study wishes to imply. The Royal Commission names two
requirements which newspapers individually and the Press collectively
should fulfill:
The first of these requirements is that if a newspaper
purports to record and discuss public affairs. 1 t should at
least record them truthfully. It may express what opinions
it pleases--and nothing we say hereafter is intended to cri-
ticise the opinion of any newspaper or to question its right
to express them--but opinion should be advocated without
suppressing or distorting the relevant facts. If a paper
adheres to a political party it should be plain to the reader
that it does so but from the columns of opinion, not from the
colouring given to the news. A paper's politics and those of
its readers will inevitably and legitimately affect its judg-
ment of the relative interest of certain items of news, but
the news it reports it should report truthfully and without
excessive bias. The second requirement is that the number
and variety of newspapers should be such that the Press as a
whole gives an opportunity for all important points of view
to be effectively presented in terms of the varying standards
of taste, political opinion, and education among the principle
groups of the population. (pp , 541-542)
Several phrases might be singled out for attention. Firstly,
that a newspaper should record and discuss public affairs truthfully;
secondly, that it should not suppress or distort relevant facts; and
thirdly, that its political affiliation should be evident from its
opinion columns and not from the "colouring given to the news." None of
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these phrases imply a lack of investigative reporting, merely that
opinions should be openly labeled rather than passed as factual, objec-
t tve accounts.
The second requirement seems to support the idea that newspapers
should have editorial policies and opinions. since it states that: "the
number and variety of newspapers should be such that the Press as a
whole gives opportunity for all important points of view to be effec-
tively presented."
The suggestion that there ought to be newspapers expressing
various points of view supports the contention that it is apparently
unwise for schools to rely on one source of information. However. the
visdom of exposing students in high school to opposing points of view
might be questioned. There may be fears that allowing contradictory
opinions to be reported and read will confuse or at worst convert young
people to undesirable attitudes. However, as long as the school pre-
sents and points out socially accepted norms. research has demonstrated
there is little danger of this happening. Hovland, Janis. and Kelley
(1953) state as a result of research which had been conducted that
people are less prone to be easily influenced when they have been fur-
nished with all the arguments on both sides in a controversy . They say:
However. if the initial communication is, instead , a two-sided
one it will already have taken into account both the positive
and negative arguments and still have reached the positive
conclusion. When the listener is then subsequently exposed to
the presentation of negative arguments in the counterpropaganda
he is less likely to be influenced in the negative direction.
He is already faadliar with the opposing point of view and has
been led to the positive conclusion in a context where the
negative arguments were in evidence. In effect, he has thus
been given an advance basis for ignoring or discoWlting the
negative arguments, and thus "innoculated" will tend to retain
the positive conclusion. [p , 111)
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the implied role of the school when students are presented with
a nUlllber of conflicting views Is to help them to decide on a socially
acceptable one. When they decide on a socially acceptable one in the
light of the arguments against it. according to the study quoted. they
would be DlOre likely to hold their convictions when they are later
presented with arguments against them. Through the study of controversy
from various points of view, the student will hopefully learn to distin-
guish reliable news accounts from unreliable, biased ones. As well,
there would be an opportunity for them to engage in critical thinking
and the decision making process which seelllS to be lacking at the pre-
sent. Dieterich (1974). in discussing the susceptibility of the modern
audience, points out that the effectiveness of persuasion is "heightened
by the fact that the educational cOllDJlunity has done so little to prepare
students in the critical reception of persuasion" (p. 477).
Methods of Implementing and Measuring Bias
It has been stated that an open expression of an opinion was not
defined as bias. Consequently the question of how to identify bias
arises. Therefore. it was necessary to discover methods by which bias
can be implanted. An attempt was llIade to find a quantitative list of
methods by which a newspaper could colour its stories, or imply atti-
tudes which it did not openly state. As well, an attempt was made to
find a method to objectively measure this bias. A useful Sutllllary of
these methods of detection of bias was detailed in a " ca t a l og of hidden
bias" compiled by Cirino (1971, pp , 134-179). Most of these will be
listed and discussed with elaboration from other sources, a discussion
of the methods which have been used to measure them, and the results.
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Firstly , t h e re is bias in new s sources . It can be ieportant to
know the poin t of o rigin of a news sto ry . Fo r eX8t1lple . on June 5 , 196 7 ,
t he Del1y S t a r , i n To ronto , car r ied a story on t he Middle East Ya r by
Ar no ld Bruner . who vas not fur the r ide nti f i e d. At t hat ti~ Mr . Brune r
was living vith h i s fal:l11y in I sra e l , ....orking from t here as a f ree lance
reporte r ( oicanlon . 196 8) . His position as a ci t izen of I srael c o uld
have i nf l ue nce d hi s a c count of th e war . but the r e a der wa s not Info reed
o f t h i s poss i b l e bia s ( p , 23). Scanlon (19 69) a lso points out that in
the t wo ma j or stories monitored during the period of the s wr vey , the
Vie t nam War and the Mi d dle East War , the major Amer i c a n wire servic e s
ap peare d t o show b i as. In the c a se of the Vi etnam cover ag e by AP. Li a s
appeare d to b e sh own fo r t he lune r ican po sition. He point s out : " Howe ve r
c ritical some s to ries may be of the u.s. pos i t i on , the y reflect the
orfenra t r on of the reporter and his a udi e n ce " (p, 10). As we l l. in the
case of AP and UPI c ove r a ge , there appeared t o be a bias fo r the I sra e li
side in the Mi dd le East tolar . The i nfl ue n ce of t he Amer ican aevs services
on the Can adian press has been we Ll, dccunenced (Butle r . 19 75; Cahill,
19 71 ; Ha r t , 1963 ; Scan lon , 196 8. 19 69, 19 74). Each of t hese stud ies
employed co n t e n t analy s i s ce tho ds using co l u:nn- in ch e s as t h e i r un it of
ee aaure , Although t here h av e be e n many q ues tions raised abou t the r eli -
abillty and. vali dity of co n ten t analy s i s studie s (La s s well , Lei tes ,
Fader , Goldsen , Gr e y, J ani s , Kap lan , Mit z , So la Pool , & Yakob a on , 19 49).
the high l e ve l o f agreement 1.1 findings by t he s e i n de pendent r e s e archers
tends to give credence to their conc lusions.
Scanlon (1969) points out several specific instances where ~
copy with just a fev words changed (for exarap I e , "President" to " pr e s i -
dent," p , 24) has been sent throu;;h the Can.a:tian Press wire services as
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a Canadian press report.
He. as a r e s ult, is pointing to the difficulty of distinguishing
what is actual Canadian material from what has originated with American
wire services. From all this evidence it eeeee logical to conclude that
Ca na di a n newspapers can become biased as a result of their news service
Secondly , there 18 bias through selection of news and omission
of news. Martin (1977) states that the press decides which issues will
be impo rtant. This haa been entitled the agenda-setting function of the
press . He states:
Does this mean that the media also determine the relative
importance of issues? That la exactly what agenda-setting
studies have shown they do. Through the sheer frequency with
which a story is told , length of the story, headline size. and
positioning. the media suggest to the general public how
important an event, issue, or candidate is • • • • Not only is
this true of media impact on the public, but the news agencies
have a similar impact on newspaper wire editors. as several
studies both in the United States and abroad have shown. The
editor tends to use more of a story, news category. or issue
on which he receives more ite1llS and longer items from the vire
services. (p , 131)
In other words the press can. by omitting one item and including
another, de termine what topics or issues the audience will evaluate as
most important . He says:
What is especially noteworthy and supportive of the
agenda-setti ng role of the press is that the peaks in news
coverage coincided with peaks in the proportion of peop le who
picked these issues as the "most important problem facing
America" in Gal lup Polls. On the other hand, they were not
the issues that people felt the government should devote most
of its attention to. Funkhouser concluded that "the average
person takes the media's word for what the 'issues' are.
whether or not he personally has any involvement or interest
in them." And, one might add, he rates them as important
whe th e r or not they have the salience in reality that the
press gives them. [p , 130)
Sometimes at the discretion of a few people on the editorial
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staff of a newspaper, a reader can be deprived of the most important
news events. that is, those that are necessary to draw sound c"nclu-
slons . Because of the importance of this source of bias, a search was
made for a method to measure If any important items of news ve ee being
omitted.
Such standard texts as those by Berelson (1952); Budd. Thorp,
and Donohew (1967); Carney (1972); Holsti (1969); Lasswell, ~.
(1949) were consulted. These sources primarily discussed nerhcde for
measuring the content, not what was omitted . However, a satis :!factory
method was ultimately located. It was devised by Price (1954) and
consisted of searching each newspaper during the study period ;f or
thirty-five events which were felt to be significant by a pane::l of
judges. Although his study dealt with political events during an elec-
tion campaign in the United States, it could be applied to other related
subject material that dealt with a distinct, two-sided event t pat lasted
for a finite sampling period.
Thirdly. there is bias through placement. Booth (1970::> in his
study found that items favourably placed are more easily recal S e d ,
McCombs and Mauro (1977) found that the greatest factor deterndining
readership was the page on which a story was located. The numt;:ler of
readers was inversely proportional to the page on which a stor)Y was
located. The second largest factor in determining readership \-'las the
size of a story. It might be concluded that an editor can make an
article appear important or highlight one side of a cont roversjy to the
detriment of another through placement of a report.
Again the method evolved by Price (1954) to measure dissplay of
stories was chosen for two main reasons. Firstly, his method edealt only
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with headlinea and was directional. as opposed to studies such as those
of Gordon (1966) which dealt with total area of a news item, and were
not directionaL Secondly. he says:
The "display index" derived from the experiment was con-
sidered to be an app rop riate weigh ting device. an index of the
prominence of display corresponding closely to reader inter-
pretation of the display designed by news edi tors o f standard
format newspapers. (p . 453)
The f ormula t ak e s into account such factors as size of headline
and page on which the story occurs. which have already been noted as
important factors In display.
Fourthly. there Is bias through "coincidental placement," The
favourable impression for one side can be increased by placing a story
that enhances that side, beside one that discredits the others. Another
way in which this method can be applied is associating t h e person or
idea one wishes to discredit with a pe rson or idea which has unp leasant
connotations. Some studies have demons trated that what Leon Festinger
has ca lled "cognitive dissonance" occurs (Carney , 1972; Mehling. 1959).
The cognitive dissonance theory contends that people want to hold con -
sistent beliefs , and upon hearing or seeing an item which is inconsis-
tent will attempt to mould what they have observed to fit their beliefs.
For example , Richard Nixon has an unfavourable public image. If a photo-
graph we re published i n which the Prime Minister was s hown consult i ng
with Ni xon in a secre tive manner , the person would either improve his or
her op inion of Richard Nixon. or , as would be more likely, lower his or
her opinion of the Prime Minister.
In order to test for thia effect. a study can be made of the
illustrations in the newspapers checking for coincidental placement,
since Mehling (1959) contends as a result of his study that it can form
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atti t udes .
Fif thly, there is bias in headlines. A. reader gets an overall
v i e w of the new!J by looking at headlines. Even though several newspapers
way receive the same vf re services with the same news. the individual
editors of each newspaper decide which he adlines to use for each event
( Scanlon, 1968). Th rough these headlines the editors can acb t eve the
impression they want to leave vith the reader. Scanlon (1969) gives
three versions of a story about the investiture of Prince Charles as
Pr i nc e of Wales, wh i ch appeared in the Canadian press during the period
of his survey. Al l o f these ve rsions CaJI)e froc. lead stories by CP , but
i n d i v i du a l editors eophasized different points. One group emphasized
th e activities of extremists, an other group mentioned both joyful cele-
b ra t i ons and extremists ' ac t Lvf t Les , and a third group only mentioned
joyful ce lebrations. Depending on which paper or which he ad Hne a
pe rs on read, they would recei ve practically opp o s ing concepts of the
s itua t i on (p , 3&) .
In order to test for bias in headline s the "display index" by
Price (1954), .+lich has been discussed previ?usly. appeared to be effec-
t ive. since it took into account not only the content of the headline .
b u t also its size and direction. In order to make a judgment of the
direction of the headlines . a method had to be devised to judge direction
which was as sc I ..nt Lf Lc as possible. A discussion of such a method is
c ont as r.e d in the following few pa ges.
Sixthly, there is bias i n wor ds . The us e of secent rcs to create
a des i r e d effec t h as been s tudied , especial ly since t he adven t of the
Na z i prop a ga n da mac h ine i n the oid 1930 ·s. The e x tent of t h e pr ob l em
wi t h seea nt t cs in rcode r n cc aeun t cat ro ns ha s be en r e cogn Lz.ed by th e
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National Council of Teachers of English in the United States. since in
their 1971 convention they passed the following resolution: "'to keep
track of, publicize. and combat semantic distortion by public officials,
candidates for office, political conmentators and all those who traMmt
through the mass media'" (Rank, 1976). Rank goes on to point out that
they fc rmed the COIllD.1ttee on Public: Doublespeak the following year.
Knowing that bias in words and "doubleapeak" exist Is one
matter, but recognizing instances of usage 18 another. Osgood (1952)
pointed out that all words in all languages have several measurable
dimensions such as: strength-weakness, active-passive, good-bad. By
measuring the norm for a society for a word on each of these ecates it
is possible to arrive at an approximate understanding of what connota-
tions that word has for that society. Through this type of measurement
it is apparently possible to ascertain 1£ a writer is attempting to
implant bias for or against his or her subject. Pratt (1969, 1972)
prepared a semantic list of vc rds with noras for Canadian society vhich
he found have positive, negative, or neutral connotations towards a
subject.
This method, although thorough and objective when applied pro-
perly, has a few weaknesses. Goundrey, Goundrey, 0' Brien, Penney,
Brown, and Furlong (1976) point out some of these. First, it does not
deal with stereotyping (Which is a form of bias which does not require
the use of literally degrading words). Secondly, it does not allOW' for
inferences which a writer l!l8y be making. Thirdly, there is no way of
effectively dealing with words not on the list or with phrases. Pratt
does suggest substituting a word from the list for a word or phrase
which is not included; however, this involves a judgment on the part of
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the reader which tends to undermine the supposedly objective base of the
measuring tool (p , 76).
As a result of these objections, studies which employed theme
analysis were surveyed. Few attempts , however, according to Rank
(1976). have been made to classify basic propaganda themes. He describes
what happened in the 1930's.
In AlIlerica. some scholars and teachers recognized early
that Hitler's propaganda blitz had serious consequences for
the world and that "something ought to be done." Thus. a
small group of concerned people joined together , formed a
group which called itself the Institute for Propaganda
Analysis , and managed to publish a few pieces, including
what became a we l l -publicized and Widely used list of what
they considered to be the seven most common propaganda
devices: glittering generalities, name-calling, transfer,
testimonial , plain folks, card-stacking , and bandwagon . (p , 3)
He goes on to say:
• • • after 40 years of the IOOst significant changes in
cOlllllUnications, in persuasion techniques, and in propaganda,
the mst commonly used item to analyze such propaganda is
still the old list of the Institute of Propaganda Analysis.
(p. 4)
He, therefore, attempts to establish a new, simplified I:lethod
which places all propaganda into two basic classifications: intensify
and downplay, that is , to intensify the side one supports through tech-
niques such as repetition and association; and to downplay the other
side through such techniques as omission, and diversion {pp , 7-17).
Although this type of classification can be useful , it appears
to lend itself to subjective classification. Because of this subjecti-
vity an attempt was made to find a method which more succinctly classi-
tied themes and yet did not require word by word analysis. Such content
analysis studies as those by BatHn (1954), Breed (1958). Budd (1964),
Bush (1951, 1960) . Carter (1957), Evarts and Stempel (1974), Klapper and
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Glock (1949) . Klein and Maccoby (1954) . Kahre (1953). Maccoby and Sabghir
(1950). Markham and Stempel (1957) . Price (1954). Sch ultz (1958) .
Stoodley (1960) . Weingast (1950) . Winham (1 9 69 ) were consulted. As a
result, a method devised by Bush (1951) which seemed to accomplish a
union between word analysis and theme analysis was found. From Bush's
(1951) study it might be concluded that there is a method by which bias
in use of words can be meas ured, so that the scorer does not either have
to r e c or d di rection of a word without regard to context. or have to
place subjective j u dgmen t on t h e material that is being read.
Seventhly, there is bias in news images. In a similar way.
words can be used to create a negative opinion of a pe rson or object.
This results In negative stereotyping. Carney (1972) points out that :
In our thinking , it would appear , we have the ability to
deal simultaneously with only a r a t h e r limited number of bits
of info rma tion: about seven or so . The mi nd cannot increase
the number of bits , but it can Increase the size and complex-
ity of each individual bit. • • . A concept consists of a
bundle of associations clustering around one or two key verbal
l abels . It should be able to be revised 1£ its holder comes
upon experience that e xpands or corrects it. Sometimes it
cannot be revised like this. It (or rathe r the readiness to
perceive which make up the attitude set in which it is embed-
ded) resists the implications of new information, for they
would necessitate extensive realignments internally . In such
cases we a re dealing with what is termed a stereotype. (p , 94)
An editor making use of stereotypes can implant an image in the
reader 's mind. Because themes convey images it seemed important to
locate a study which dealt with phrase units , instead of just word
units. As a result , the content analysis method devised by Bush (1951)
seemed particu larly suitable .
Lastly, there is bias in photograph select ion and captions. By
placing a certain photograph in a newspaper the editor can create an
impression which is biased. An example of biased photographs can be
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observed in the way the news media In the United States often showed
pictures of ex-President Ford tripping and stumbling. This created the
impression of a fumbling. incompetent person. This type of portrayal
was one of the main reasons for studying photographs .
Implications of Studies
There would appear to be little reason to be confident that
individual newspapers are worthy of increased credibility . In Ca na da
they are highly influenced by the American wire services. with their
American biases. While In the United States there Is reason to believe
that the issues the newspapers present to the public are not those of
greatest importance to the general public. especially in the field of
politics. There is the possibility that through omission of certain
events , and emphasis on others they are setting an agenda for the general
public that has little to do with the actual situation. Dieterich
(1974), in discussing the problem involved in dealing with modern CODlDlU-
nications, refers to ccements made by Professor Konrad Lorenz. He says:
Professor Konrad Lorenz of West Germany's Max Institute
for Behavioral Physiology recently compared thought manipula-
tion in the West, through advertising , opinion research, and
news management, with the same process in the ccenums t bloc,
concluding that the goal of reducing the individual to an
easily controlled unit is the same in both systems . As Lorenz
suggests, the aim of much modern persuasion is not cceecntce-
tion; is not an increase in understanding; according to
Jacques EllUl, the aim is not even to modify people's ideas on
a given subject. Rather, the aim is to achieve conformity in
the way that people act. (p. 477)
This conformity of thought can be accomplished through biased
reporting in several ways that have been verified by a number of
sources. Some of these are display of a story. size and position as
well as wording of headlines, and use of illustrations . It might be
31
questioned whether newspapers c01llllonly used in Newfoundland schools
employ these methods either consciously or unconsciously.
The teacher who uses one newspaper to discuss current events is
as suaf.ng that paper will give the students all the relevant information.
The studies which have been recently conducted on newspapers in North
America would seem to raise many doubts about this assumption.
Statement of Hypotheses
Although a considerable amount of information on the press can
be inferred from studies which have been already conducted, there is no
specific information on the adequacy of any particular paper's coverage
of an event for the purpose of current events studies . Since there Is
evidence t ha t teachers do use newspapers for this purpose, it would seem
necessary to eeasure the newspapers in some manner to deterudne if they
do carry sufficient infonnation on both sides of a controversy to be
used in the classroom so that students can learn to make well-founded
judgments based on critical thinking. If it can be demonstrated that
the newspapers give biased information on one particular issue, the
suggestion can be made that they are doing so on others.
Methods of determining bias in newspapers have already been
devised by other researchers and can be applied in new situations.
Using these methods and keeping in mind results of studies which have
been conducted, it is possible to make several hypotheses about the
contents of a sample of newspapers for a given event.
L The display of headlines as measured by the "display index" in
the sample newspapers will show measurable bias .
2. The content of the sample newspapers measured in column-inches
32
will show measurable bias.
3. The illustrations in the sample newspape rs measured in column-
inches will show measurable b Lae ,
4. The selection and omission of stories in the sample newspapers
will show measurable bias .
5. The sample newspapers will tend to show similar bias to each
other.
6. The sample newspapers studied will tend to show similar bias to
that which has been found to occur in the American press .
7. Each newspaper studied will show bias in the same direction on
each measure used.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
The purpose of this study was to determine if newspapers are
biased 1n their coverage of current events . In order to determine 1f
this bias existed, it was decided that some type of a sampling method
was necessary since the volume of news events and newspapers, even in
one year. would make a complete study of all news events impossible.
Consequently. it was necessary to carry out sampling techniques on
several different levels. First, a sample of newspapers was taken;
secondly, a sample event within these newspapers was choeen ; and finally,
a sample of coverage of the event from each newspaper was chosen. In
order to assess the content of the sample, four separate analyses were
carried out. The first analysis examined the reliability of the news-
papers ; it attempted to ascertain the percentage of important news items
for each side which were carried by each paper. The second analysis was
of the display of headlines which was to ascertain the amount of display
given to each side. The third analysis was of illustrations measured in
column-inches to see which side had been given more coverage pictorially.
The final analysis was of the number of column-inches devoted to each
side. Each of these analyses was tested with chi square to see if there
was any significant difference in coverage between the two sides.
Composi tion of Sample
Selection of Newspapers
The first decision to be made involved which newspapers to study.
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It was considered necessary to examine newspapers to which Newfoundland
student.s in all probability would be exposed; that is, those published
in the province. As well , it was decided to attempt to compare those
sources to others frolll outside the province. This cOll.parlsan was an
attempt to find out If provincial newspapers were any IIIOre or less
suitable for school use than their ccunte rpar te in other parts of the
country. It was decided as a result of these criteria to study the
Daily News and the Evening Telegram as the two largest circulation
provincial newspapers . Because of the amount of work involved, the
study of papers from outside the province had to be limited to one
paper. The Globe & Hail was chosen as one of Canada's largest: circula-
tion papers in one of Canada 's largest cities. This ....as done on the
assumption that it vould have many more resources to supply ne ....s at its
disposal than the two Newfoundland papers. (Circulation figures and
ownership for each paper in the study are included in Table 1.)
Sample of Events
A selection of events to exa.Jlline vas necessary. Because the
purpose of this research vas to exaatne bias in lI.aterials ....hich might be
used by high school students to study controversial current events, it
....as decided to take one national event and one international of the type
they would be likely to deal with in the classroom. Alao, most of the
research ....hich had previously been conducted dealt ....ith two-sided events,
....hich had lasted for a finite period of time (e.g., American Presidential
elections) . As a result, it was decided to examine the federal election
of 1974 as a national event and the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 or the Yon
Kippur War, as an international event. Both events involved a finite
Tab le 1
Circulation Figures and Ownership of Papers
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Title Publishe r Owner Circulation Figures
.
~ Daily News Crosbie Group 8 .360d
N~, Ltd . of Companies a lO,623e
10,193£
Evenins se. John 's Thomsonb 3D,87Sd
Telegram Publishing 48,2288Co.• Ltd .
Globe & Globe & Free Pressc 262,111 d
Hail Mail, Ltd . 266 .1078
.
All circulation figures were obtained from Aver Directory of Publica-
tions (1977)
SInformation obtained from Daily News office.
°Information obtained from Evening Te l e gr am office.
Clnformation obtained from Report of Special Senate COlllJlllttee on Mass
Media (1970)
<!weekly circulation figures.
eWednesday ci rculation figures (South Coast Supp leme nt).
fFriday circulation fig u res (last publication for week).
gSaturday circulation.
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period of ~lme and in both cases the re were two sides . In the case of
the war there were the Israelis and Arabs . and in the case o f the elec-
tion there were pro-government and ane f-gcve meenc forces . Because of
the limtat ions of the thesis . it: was not possible t o analyze both
of these events, using the four met hods. of analysis which had been
.selected. Consequently , it ....as necessary either t o lillltt the nw:iber of
analyses to be conducted to one or t o limit the nuebe r of events to be
analyzed to one. Because each of the ana lyses was t hought to rr:easure a
different aspect of biased reporting , and because the establishment of a
met ho do l ogy for future studies was considered iJ:J!portant, it was decided
to analyze oaly one eeent • The Ar ab- I s r ae li \Jar was p Lckr d because it
was two-sided and it could be core easily fitted t.o the t.yp e of instru-
mcntfl which had been designed for studying bias in Aee etcan e lec tions.
There would have been soee prcb Ieas with the Canadian e lections since
t.hey involve four parties instead of two.
Sm~l!>le of Mat erial
Once the papers and the event. had been selected. some choice of
material had to be made. It was decided to use mate rial which came from
the news columns of the papers in the sample. In order to def Lne this
mat e r i al it i s perhaps b est to de e c r-Ibe wh a t rsate r-La L has been omitted .
It has been s t a t ed before, in e e t t Ing up criteria for the press. that
a newsp aper h as a ri~ht to expr'e s s editorial polici e s . ("If a paper
adh eres to a political par ty it shoul d b e pLa.Ln to the reader that it
doe s so but t rce t h e co l umns of op inion . not from the colouri n g g i ven to
the news ." Royal CODIlDis s i on on t he Pr ess , 1947 -19 49, p- 54 1,) Conse-
qu e n tly, t here was no coiling of edito r ial mat e r i a l. Editorial material
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was defined as any material included on the editorial pages, as well as
any t tees which were labelled edt torial, "assessment." or "analysis" on
other pages. Included with this editorial uterIal as well were any
articles which involved investigative reporting. Investigative reporting
was defined as any article or articles where: 1) a reporter signs his
name and affIlIation , and 2) he or she states openly which side he or
she is supporting and why.
Next. an attempt was made to take a sample of the events over a
period of time. Before doing this, several articles on content analysis
sampling were revteved , particularly those by Budd ( 1964) . Coats and
Mulkey (1954) , Davis and Turner (1952). and Stempel (1952). In Stemple's
(1952) analysis of sampling newspapers for a period of one year , he
found that "increasing the aaap Ie size beyond 12 does not produce marked
differences in the results" (p , 333) . Consequently, it was decided to
take a sample of 12 newspapers dUring the sampling period. As a slllllpling
period, it was decided to begin three days before the war , for a period
of two ecntne •
The general plan for sampling was simlar to that described by
Budd !.!..E.. (1967). A list of all the dates during the sample period
(excluding Sundays, when there were no papers) was draw up; then a
table of random number was employed to choose the dates for the study.
As a result the following dates during the sampling period were chosen:
October B, 12, 19, 23, 25, 29, 30; November B, 13, 15 , 17; and December
3. (Except in the case of the Daily Newa, Monday, November 19, was
choaen instead of November 17 because the Daily News was not published
on Saturdays.)
At the end of the process of sampling the material to be sub-
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j e c t e.d to analysis had been considerably narrowed . The number of news-
papers had been limited to three (the Daily News . the Evening Telegram.
and the Globe & Mail). the sample event had been chosen, the type of
material to be analyzed had been determined (the contents of news col-
umns). and the dates for the analyses had been picked at random.
Content Analysis of Materials
The type of analysis to be performed on this material had to be
selected. As a result of investigating various methods of implanting
bias. and various types of content analysis studies. four methods of
analysis were chosen, 88 well as an overall method of cataloguing
stories directionally.
Some researchers who have compared content analysis methods
consider it is sufficient to measure column-inches (Markham & Stempel.
1957; Price . 1954). However, the number of different methods by which
bias can be implanted seemed to point to the necess t ty of conducting
several different types of analysis. As well, different influences
produce different parts of a newspaper. For example. the content of an
international story in a paper like the Evening Telegram or the Q!lli
~ usually comes directly through the wire services; whereas the head-
lines are written by editors in the individual newspapers. As well .
selection and rejection of news stories has a great deal to do with the
editorial policy of a newspaper. For these reasons, it was decided to
include separate analyses for: inclusion-exclusion of stories (relia-
bility), headline display and direction, column-inches devoted to each
side, and illustrations.
Besides these considerations, it was felt that bias shown in the
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s ame direction on all four analyses ...oul d be a ehe ck for t he rel1abl1ity
and validity of the study.
Direction of Material
In attelllpting to define ins tances of bias it Is particularly
helpful to have s pe c if i c. guidelines to deter!lline direction. Kaplan and
Geldsen (l9 49 ) found t h a t co der r eliabil i ty could be improve d to a 90 %
level by giving t he lD some practice and lPaking guidelines as specific as
possible. Consequently , a search was made for some type of an instru-
men t to objectively place i t e ms in pro- or antl- categories to detennine
b ias . Pratt ' s method (1 9 72) ( t h a t is , us i n g cer tain wor d s , whi ch h av e
been semantically measured for favourabllity-unfavourabll1ty , to deter-
min e bi as in co verage) was considered , but rejected for reasons already
outlined ; although his lis t was kept to h e lp i n deciding the direction
of difficult i tems . (Fnvourable-unfavournble words , pp , 39-4 1, were
listed as well a s his ru les for using them , pp . 15-26.) Ultimately. it
was decided to us e an adaptation of pro}'!l.ganda theees devised by Bush
(1951) fo r his study. The list o f t he Cles was as follows :
1. active-pass ive - - the group is capab l e (o r i ncapab le'> of car rying
out po licies advocated ; individual leaders are presen ted as
active. cccpe tent individuals (passive. Lncoerpe t e nt.) ,
2 . honest-dishonest -- the leaders or peopIe are s how n to have
personal virtue ( or l a ck l,lI it) (e.g. , accusing one side or t he
other of attacking civil i an populations or ed s t reat Ing prisoners
o f war wou l d be neg a ti ve ).
3. poverfuf- un pov e r fuk - - t h e leaders, a rced f o r ces , or pe op le are
shown to have high morale . be un ited, or to be assured of vic-
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tory (or the opposite of these).
4. positive values-negative values -- leaders, armed forces. or
people are associated with socially approved (or disapproved)
values (e. g •• associating one side or the other with COUlllaJnlam
or COl!lllunlsts liQuId be unfavourable in our aocial context).
5. strength-veaknes8 -- a statement presenting the leader's posi-
tion on an issue or event in conjunction with a favourable (or
unfavourable) evaluation of the issue or event.
These were constantly referred to, especially in cases which
were difficult. In the case of the co lumn-inches study , a similar
method was used , but an attempt vee made to see If both sides we re given
equal t reatment during the course of the article .
Analysis of Reliability
The first content analysis study to be perfot"Clled on the material
was one for 're Ldabd Id t y , Reliability was defined as the amount of
coverage given to each of the two sides in the following way.
For the en tire sampling period. that is, every day between
Oc t obe r 5 an d December 3 , a list of what were thought t o be the 100 IDOst
important events was compiled. As r e f e r ence s to develop this list , the
following sources were employed: 1) the Christian Science Monitor,
2) Keesing's Contemporary Archives , 3) Facts on File , 4) the Times
(London) , and 5) t he New York Times.
A questionnaire was next developed which was given to people
involved in the study of current events f rom an academic point of view.
It was thought they would be well suited to completing these question-
naires because: 1) they would be less likely to be influenced by the
41
" a genda setting" role of the press. and 2) they would have historical
insigh t in choos ing thei r impo rtance . Although this may i n dee d ha ve
been t rue . t he y each pointed out the d iffi culty . if n ot Impossibl1i ty of
t he t as k of deciding which event vas more impo r tant . It vas pointed out
verba lly a number of t I mes, " I mpo r t an t from whose point of view?" Ul ti-
mate ly , i n spi te of t he s e objections an d r e se rv at i o ns, thre e p rofesso rs.
Dr. Geoff rey Jo nes (Soci a l Studies Educ ation) . Ms. Louise neve (History
Depa rtment) . and Dr. Steven Wol1ne tz (Political Science Department) did
agree t o complete t he questionnaires. (See Appe ndix A for an eXalllple of
the ques tionn ai re.) They wer e asked to pick t he 30 DIOs t impo r tant
even ts f rom t he 100, t o r an k th e m f rom most impo rtant t o leas t impo r -
tant. and to assign each event a direct ion. The list which had been
developed fo r deteIlllining di rection was included in the ques tionnaire,
as wel l as ins t ructions stating that a "+" was to be gi ven to i t ems
which we re e i t he r p r o- Is rae li or anti -A rab an d a It _It was t o be given t.o
evence which we re p ro-Arab o r anti-Is rae li.
When the questionnaires were r e t u rn e d . the results we re ente red
into a previous ly cons t r ucted t able (see Appendix B) . The events which
were chosen by t wo or more reade rs were noted a l on g wi th th e dir e c ti on
which had been assigned. Altogether a total of 35 events was compiled .
(Two r e a de r s had _rked several events tentatively. and gave permission
to us e t hose if it became necessary to complete t he list of 35 .)
Eac h of these 35 events was wri tten on a separate i ndex ca rd .
Next , a t ab l e was co ns tructed (see Appendix C) so tha t the presence or
absence of these events could be noted for each newsp aper. as well as
the i r dire ct i on. posi tion i n t he news p ape r . and whe t he r or not t hey
r ated a he adline . Besides thi s a no t e was made of a l a ck of de tail in
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any story.
Each copy of the Daily News, t.he Evening telegram. and the Gl ob e
& Mail from October 5 to December 3 was studied to see if it contained
each of these 35 events . The results were then recorded in Tables 2 to
7. The final percentages for pro-Arab and pro-Israeli stories included
were then tested with a chi square test to see if the omission of
stories for one side or the other was statistically significant. As
well, the percentage of stories included (that Is, in all categories.
positive, negative, and neutral) of the total possible stories (35) was
determined.
The listing of events was also used to check the reliability of
the researcher in assigning direction. Since these 35 stories were the
most. important during the war. it was helpful to be able to see how
other independent people had coded them.
Analysis of Headlines
A formula was used to calculate headline display. Price (1954)
defined this formula as: "an index of prominence of display corresponding
to reader interpretation of display designed by news editors of standard
format newspapers" [p , 453).
The formula is as follows:
where:
Xl is the position in the newspaper on the following 3-point
scale:
1 - 1 to 6 inches high on page 1; 1 to 16 inches high inside
2 - 7 to 16 inches high on page 1; 17 inches to top of
inside pages
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3 - 17 inches to top of page 1
Xz is height of headline from bottom of page in inches
X4 Is size of type In main deck of headline in points
X' Is display index
As well , each headline was given a pro-Israeli, anti-Arab (+) or
pro-Ar ab , anti- Israeli (-) direction. Direction was determined by
looking at the directions coders had assigned on the listing of major
events. by using the guidelines fo r propaganda themes. and by referring
to Pratt's list (1972).
Each headline in the 12 sample issues was scored using a table
(see Appendix D). Fo r each of the 12 issues of each newspaper , all
positive scores were totaled and all ne gat i ve scores were totaled . The
results were placed in Table 8, and tested for significance using a chi
square test.
Ana lysis of Column-inches
The column-inches devoted to each story. excluding the headlines .
were measured and tabula ted on a score shee t (see Appendix E). Each
story was assigned a direction using similar c riteria to those al ready
desc ribed. The t ot a l s for each newspaper were calculated in a similar
manner. The results were enumerated using Table 9, and these results
were tested for significance using chi square.
Analysis of I llustrations
The illustrations (including the caption) of personalities or
events of the war during the 12 day sample period (excluding edi torial
material) was measured in column-inches. It was also assigned direction
using similar criteria to that for assessing headline direction. These
44
were tabulated on a score sheet (see Appe ndix E). The totals for each
direction for each newspaper were then i ncluded in Table 10 . The results
were tested for significance using chi square .
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Chapter 4
Results
The results of all four analyses were enlightening. The results
of each study will be discussed first, and afterwards, these will be
considered as they apply to the hypotheses.
Reliability of Newspapers
One of the most informative results of the analyses turned out
to be the replies to the questionnaires to pick the 35 IIlOS[ important
events. As has already been stated, the three professors who coded them
did so In spite of objections and reservations . These reservations
would seem to be justified since there were only seven events which all
three picked as important (see Appendix B). Two of the three found it
impossible to rate the events in order of importance. These difficul-
ties forcefully illustrate the dilemmas which daily face wire editors,
who are under pressure to meet deadlines , as well as being presented
with volumes of material from which they must choose the most important
events and stories to include in their papers. The reasons for their
reliance on the wire services' "budget" lists becomes clear. Also, this
difficulty in choosing underlines the necessity for teachers to look to
a number of sources so that the students can observe a number of editors'
assessments of the most important events . In spite of the coders'
reservations and the obvious difficulties, it was possible to choose 35
events for which to check the three newspapers (see Appendix B). This
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was accompl ished by choosing the events that two or more coders had
marked. (Some of these had been marked tentatively by the coders. who
gave permiss ion to use them i f necessary to complete the list.) The
results of this study can be observed 1n Tables 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, as
well as Appendices A, B, and C.
Results for Gl obe [. Mail
Th e results of this analysis of newspaper reliability for the
Gl ob e I) Mail can be observed in Tables 2 and 3.
Table 2
Re liab i lit y of Newspapers . Gl ob e Ii. Mai l. Events .
Pro-Israeli Pro-Arab Neutral
Reported
Omitted
Total
14
16
Table 3
11
14
Reliability of Newspapers. Globe I) Mail.
Difference 1n Coverage
% Pro-Israeli
Included
% Pro-Arab
Included
% Included of
Total Pos s i b l e
85.7 %
leh! square indicated a significant difference
between coverage, X2 (l ) - 4 .704,2.< .05 .
It can be seen from Table 3 that the Gl obe (, Mail included 87.5%
of the pro-Israeli stories and 75 .6 % of the pro-Arab stories . Ch i
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sq ua re i n dica t e d a signif icant d iffe r e nce between the cove r age ,
X2 (l ) - 4 .704, .E.< . OS.
On the other hand i t vas found that the Globe & Kail included
30 of a total possible 35 stories; that: la , 85 .7%. This could be taken
to mean th at the Globe & Hail was p resenting eee e of the illportant
events to its readers.
Resul ts fo r Evenin g Teleg ram
I n Tab l es 4 an d 5 t h e r e sults o f this an alysis fo r t h e Evenin g
Te l e g ram are recorded .
Tab l e 4
Rel i abili ty of Newspapers. Eve nin g Te l egram. Eve n ts .
Pro-Israeli Pro -A rab Neutral
Repo r ted 11
Omitted
Total 16
Tab le 5
14
Reliabili ty of Revepape ra , Evenin g Teleg ram .
Diffe re nce in Cove rage
% Pr o- Is r aeli
I nc l ude d
68.7%
% Pro-Arab
I nclude d
57 . 1%
% I ncl ude d of
To tal Possib l e
65 .7 %
I t can be seen t h a t the Eve ning Te le gram i ncluded only 68 .7% of
t he Is rae li s to ries. an d 57 . 1% of t he Ar ab s tories. This was not f oun d
t o be statistically s ignificant. Howeve r . the re were a highe r numbe r of
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stories favouring the Israeli side .
Also , it can be seen that the Evening Telegram included only
65 .7% of the t o t a l 35 stories. From Appendix C. it can be observed that
many of these 'Were without detail. A person reading the Evening Tele gram
for information about that event apparently would not be able to as ce r -.
t afn all that was necessary for thorough understanding .
Results for Daily News
The results for this analysis for the Daily News can be seen in
Tables 6 and 7.
Table 6
Reliability of Newspapers. Daily News. Events .
Pro -Israeli Pro-Arab Neutral
Reported
Omitted
Total 16
Table 7
14
Reliability of Newspape rs. Dai ly News.
Difference in Coverage.
% Pro-Israeli
Included
43.7%
% Pro-Arab
Included
35.7%
% Included of
Total Possible
48 .5%
It can be seen that the Daily Ne....s included 43.7% of the pro-
Israeli stories and 35.7% of the pro-Arab stories . This was n o t found
to be a statistically significant difference . However , there ....ere a
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higher number of scories favouring the pro-Israeli side .
It can be seen that the Da11y News included only 48.5% of the
tota l of 35 stories . Like the Evening Telegram. the Dally News seemed
to excl ude many necessary details . &.9 can be observed in Appendix C.
Although , in f ai rn e s s to the Daily News, it makes no claim t o be an ything
more than a local St . J ohn ' s paper, it wou l d seem i t could do a better
job of repo rting int.ernational news.
Meas ure of Hea dline Disp lay
Each headline in the sample period in each newspaper was measured
in three ways. The heIght of the headline itself was measured in points.
t he distance of the headline from t he bct t ca of the page in inches was
recorded, and the page on which the headline appeared was no t e d . The
indexes fo r e a ch headline were then calculated using the fomula which
has already been men tioned. Each headline was assigned a direction.
The total indexes for each newspaper for e ac h of positive and negative
we r e t o t a l e d an d noted in Table 8.
Tab le 8
Headline Displ ay
Pape r Total A B Di f f e r e n ceIndexes Pr o- I s r ae l i Pro-Arab of % (A - B)
Globe & 8488 Inde xe s 5295 In dexes 3193
Mail % of t o t a l 62 %1 % of total 37 %1 +25 %
Evening 3023 Indexes 1381 1642
Telesrlllll X of total 45. 7% X of total 54.3% - 8. 6%
~ 2828 Indexes 1675 I ndexes 1153
News % of t otal 59 . 3% % of total 40. 7% +18 .6 %
l eh i squa re indicated a s ignificant di f f e r e nce between cove rage,
X2(l) • 4.76, R.(.05 .
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Results for Globe Ii. Mail
As can be observed in Table 8, the Globe Ii. Mail devoted 62 % of
the measured space to headlines which were pro-Israeli. and 3 7% of the
measured space to headlines which were pro-Arab. This indicated a
significant difference be tween coverage of the sides, X2( l) - 4.76,
.E.( .05. This might be interpreted to mean the Globe Ii. Mail was showing
a eeeaureb Ie pro-Israeli bias.
Results for Evening Telegralll
As can be observed in Table 8, the Evening Telegram devoted
45 .7% of the measured apace to headlines which were pro-Israeli and
54.3% of the measured space to headlines which were pro-Arab. This was
not a statistically significant difference. However, it can be observed
as a reversal of the previous ee asures for the Evening Telegr8DI's bias.
Since headlines are written by individual newspaper editors, the possi-
bility could be considered that the paper's editors were attempting to
present a different viewpoint from that which was being received from
the wire services. This possibility will be discussed more fully later
in the light of all the results.
Results for Daily News
As can be seen in Table 8 , the Daily News devoted 59.3% of the
measured space to pro-Israeli headlines and 40.7% of ita space to pro-
Arab headlines. This was not statistically significant. Hcrwever, more
space was devoted to the pro-Israeli point of view.
Measure of Column-inches
This was the most difficult analysis to complete, since a large
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number of s t o rie s in all three papers con t a i ne d COlllllents from both sides .
An attelllpt was eede to ascertain if an e qu a l amount of s pa ce wi t h i n each
story was devoted t o each side' s ve rs ion of the situation and if each
side's version was given equal credibility ( if there were no impartial
outside observers to confirm or reject) . In many cases the researcher
found this t o be true , so the story was marked neutral. In aome cases .
however, one side or the o ther was given an advantage, and these t teee
were coded accordingly.
The results of the analysis of size of s t o r i e s in col umn- i n ch e s
(e xc l us i ve of headlines . since these ha ve already been measured ) can be
s ee n i n Table 9 .
Table 9
cotuen-Lncbee
Pape r Total Pro-Israeli Pro-ArabCol . -inches
Gl obe & 928 .25 col.-inches 652 1 col.-inches 276.25 1
Hail % of total 70 .2 3% % of total 29.76%
Even i n g 296.25 c ol. - i nche s 167 .75 col .-inches 128.5
Telegram, % of total 56.6% % of t o t a l 43.4%
!!.!ili 190 .5 co l. - inche s 102.75 col. -inches 87 .75
News 1 of total 53 .9 % % of total 46.2%
l Ch i square i ndicated a significant difference be tween t he coverage.
X2(l) • 16 . 37, .E.< .05.
Re s u l t s for Gl obe Ii. Hail
The Gl obe Ii. Hai l devoted 70.23% of its space to stories that
ve re pro-Israeli and 29 .76% of it s eeeeured space to stories that were
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pro-Arab . A signi f i cant difference vas noted be t wee n the coverage ,
X2 ( 1) • 16.37 • .E.(.05. Consequently. tbe Gl obe & Hail might be said t o
be displaying a pro-Israeli bias.
Results fo r Even i n g Te legr am
As c an be seen in Tab le 9 . the EvenIng Tele gram devoted 56.6% of
I ts measured space to s t o r i e s that we re pro-Israeli and 43 . 4% of it s
measured s pace to stories t.hat. were p ro-Arab . This was not statistically
significant; however, it does show that IIlOre space was given to the pro-
Is raeli point of view.
Res ults for Daily News
As can be seen f rom Table 9 , t h e Daily News devoted 53.9% of its
eeasured space to stories that were pro-Israeli and 46.1 % t o stories
that were pro-Arab. This was not significant. but did show DICIre ap ac e
devoted to the pro-Israeli point o f viev .
Meas ure of I llus t rations
All illustrations dealing with the war or persona involved in
the war were analyzed for direction and then measured in co Iuea-dnchee ,
including captions. The picture s we r e analyz ed for themes (the same as
those employed in other analyses ) in order to assign direction. Fo r
example, a picture o f Arab prisoners was cou nted as pro-Is raeli, since
it showed the Israelis in a powerful pos ition. The method of coding can
be observed in Appendix E . and the results are displayed in Table 10 .
Results for Gl ob e & Mail
As can be seen in Table 10 , the Glo be & Mail devoted 95 % o f its
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Table 10
Illustrations
Paper Total Pro-Israel1 Pro-ArabCol.-inches
Globe (, 269.25 col. -inches 257.25 1 col. - Ln ch es 12 1
Mail % of total 95 % % of total 5%
Evening 50 .5 col.-inches 50.5 1 col. -inches 0 1
Telegram % of total 100% % of total 0%
Q!lli 61.5 col.-inches 42.01 col.-inches 19.5 1
News % of total 68.3% % of total 31 .7%
l Ch! square i ndicated a significant difference between the coverage for
each of t he s e.
illustration space to pro-Israeli material , and 5% of its illust ration
space to pro-A rab material. Chi square indicated a significant differ-
ence between the coverage. X2 (l ) - 81. £.(.05.
Results for Evening Telegram
As can be seen in Table 10, t.he Evening Telegram devoted 100 % of
i t s illustration space to pro-Israeli material. Chi square indicated a
significant difference be cveen coverage , X2(1) • 100 , £ <. 05 .
Results for Daily News
As can be seen in Table 10, the Daily News devoted 68.3% of its
illustration space t o pro-Israeli material and 31. 7% to pro-Arab material.
Chi sq uare indicated a significant diffe rence betveen coverage,
X2 (l ) - 13.38, £ < .05.
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Discussion of Reliability
A short discussion of the reliability of these results would
seem to be necessary. Although the researcher did most of the coding.
an attempt was made to clearly define t h e categories , and each of the
analyses w as performed cvr ce , The testing periods were several months
apart . giving the r e s e a r ch e r an opportunity to rethink some decisions ,
as wel l as to more clearly conceptualize the propaganda themes . There
were obviously some it12111S which were difficult to code. For example.
the Arab oil embargo was very difficult t.o place . Was it pro-Arab
because i t showed the Arabs in a position of power , or was it pro-Israeli
because i t was adversely affecting Western countries? For the most part,
stories about this event were thought to be pro-Ara.b ; however, in a fey
cases where there were references such as "refusing to submi t to Arab
b Lackmaj l ," these were coded as pro-IsraelI. Another factor which was
helpful in coding was the l i s t which was compiled from the three returned
questionnaires . Since eoat of the 100 events were given '1 direction by
at l e a s t one of the three professors who did the coding , t h i s researcher's
reliability could be checked by referring to this list. Final ly, there
may have been items which were omitted through oversight . However , since
these omissions were unintentional, they were. in e ffect. random, and
were as likely to favour one side as the other . Consequently. in the
opinion of the researcher , these aneIyses were as 're Lf ab Le as possible.
Discussion of Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: The selection and omission of stories in the sample
newspapers will show measurable bias.
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This hypothesis was supported only for the Globe & Mail. In the
two other newspapers. although they both had a larger number of stories
favouring one side than the other. a difference was not stat.istically
significant.
In this analysis. the total nUllber of stories omitted was of
interest. The Evening Telegram only carried 65 .1% of the 35 stories,
and the Daily News only carried 48.5% of the 35 stories. In addition to
this low percentage of coverage . lllaIly stories lacked essential detail
when compared to the lis[ of events vht ch had been compiled for the
questionnaire . For example. the terms of the cessefire outlined by the
Security Council on October 21, 1973, were not given . These terms
seemed to be essential to unde r s t andf.ng the situation which developed
later.
Hypothesis 2: The content of the sample newspapers eeaaured in column-
inches will show measurable bias.
This hypothesis was supported only for the Globe & Mail. The
other newspapers, although they both deeons t reted bias in the same
direction, did not demonstrate a statistically significant difference.
Hypothesis 3: The display of headlines in the aaapIe newspapers as
measured by the "display index" will show measurable
bias.
This hypothesis was supported only for the Globe & Mail. The
Daily News showed bias towards the same side as in the previous analyses,
but not to a statistically significant extent. The Evening Telegram
showed bias in the opposite direction, but again, not to a statistically
significant extent. Since headlines are written locally. and every
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other ee asure showed a pro-Israeli bias. it might be concluded that the
local editors were displaying a different bias from the wire service
coverage.
Hypothesis 4 : The illustrations in the sample newspapers will show
meas urab le br ee , when measured in column-inches.
This hypothesis was supported to a statistically significant
l eve l fo r all three newspapers.
Hypothesis 5: The sample newspapers will tend to show similar bias to
each other.
This hypothesis was not supported. The intention of this hypo-
thesis was to point out the "agenda set tins" function of the news ser-
vices. as well as the dependence of newspape rs on similar so urces. This
was quite a small 88IIlp1e about which to dr ev such a conclusion. especially
since many of the measures were not statistically significant. However.
i t might be noted that 11 of the 12 measures showed bias in the same
direction.
Hypothesis 6: The newspapers studied will t e nd to show similar bias t o
that vhtch has been found to occur in the American press.
This hypothesis vas not supported. However. there appeared to
be a tendency for the results in this study to agree vith Scanlon's
statements (1968). He pointed out that M and UPI appeared to show a
pro-Is raeli bias. This pro-Israeli bias was also demonstrated in 11 of
the 12 studies conducted , although not alvays to a statistically signi-
ficant extent.
Hypothesis 7: Each individual newspaper analyzed will show bias in the
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same direction on each llle4Sure used.
This hypothesis was supported tor both the Globe & Hail and the
Daily News on every measure. In the c.se of the Evening Telegram, it
was found to be true on ebeee of the four measures. The significance
of the score on headline display index has already been noted.
Limitations to Study
There were several limitations to this study . Most of these
resulted from the constraints of conducting research. where funds and
the amount of work which can be done are not without bounds. It was
necessary to cut the number of newspapers to be analyzed to three from
an original design of ten. partially because of work limitations , and
partially because some of the nesspaps ra were not available in the
university library. It was also neceeserv to dispense with the study
of a national event or to dispense with SOllie of the types of analysis
which were being conducted. (That is, just to conduct a colullbl-inches
analysis.) It was thought to be neces e erv to conduct each of these
analyses to detect bias, since bias can be implanted in so many different
ways; besides, the establishment of a lllethodology for detecting bias
seemed to be important; consequently. the study of a national news event
had to be omitted. It i.s hoped that another study of a national news
event will be conducted. utilizing the established methodology.
Perhaps the greatest liJlitat!on was the lack of coders. The
researcher was the only person to code the bulk of the material in the
study; consequently. the researcher's own bias could have influenced
the results. Howeve r. because the criteria for placing material in pro-
Israeli and pro-Arab categories had been carefully determined and
58
because many of the events covered had been placed in categories by the
three coders in the reliability analysis. a great deal of the subjec-
tivity was removed from the coding . For a sample of the type of coding
which the researcher did, it 1s possible to refer to Appendixes 0 and E.
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Chapte r 5
Discussion , Conclusions. an d Recoumendat ions
The r ationale f or b ringing con t r ove rs ial cu r r e n t events in t o t he
c ur r i cu l um has be e n di s c us s e d ear lie r. I n orde r t o de cide 1£ e ach ne ws-
paper s t udied car ried suffieient Lnf ormat fcn on both sides of a contro-
versy to be used in current events classes as r es our ce mate rial , this
rationale will be reviewed briefly . Four of the reasons for bringing
current events materials into the classroom were stated as follows :
1) to prepare students for the future in a fast changing wor ld :
2) t o bring about greater unde rstanding of othe r societies ;
3) to deve lop b e t te r und erstan ding among t he sectors of Cana di a n
socie ty;
4) t o t e a ch s tudents t o make l ogi cal poli t ical de cisions based on
r e fl e cti ve th inking.
The hypo theses vht ch ve r e tes ted 1o'i11 be discussed with r e f ere n ce
to bcv well these goals of instruction could be expected to be imple-
mented using newspapers s imilar to those in the sample .
Discussion of Hypotheses
Discussion of Hypo theses 1, 2. 3 . an d 4
The analyses of selection and omission of s to ries . co lumn-inches
devoted t o a story. display of headlines. and illus trations in the
sample newspapers each had a tendency to support the hypotheses which
ve r e se t out. This r e s ult would seem to have significant implications
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for the use of newspapers in studying controversial current events. The
Globe & Mail appeared to be demonstrating measurable bias 1n each of
these analyses. As a result , it might be concluded that a teacher who
utilized the Globe & Mail in the classroom in an attempt to keep students
advised on future happenings would probably be presenting a biased view
of the future. The Report of the Special Senate Committee on Mass Media
(1970) states: "The media's job is to bring forward as many facts. as
many informed judgments on that F.e. changes in SOciet~ as possible"
(p , 85). A newspaper presenting a larger number of stories supporting
one side more than the other is not likely to accomplish this purpose.
The same comment can be made about the goal of teaching students to make
logical political decisions based on reflective thinking. If the source
they are reading is presenting more arguments for one side than the
other. students would probably tend to support the side which is more
favourably presented. because they do not have enough knowledge about
the subject to make a logical decision .
The Daily News and the Evening Telegram appeared to be even less
suitable for classroom study as a result of these analyses. Although
they demonstrated no measurable bias on some of the individual analyses.
in the case of the Daily News all four analyses showed bias in one
direction. and in the case of the Evening Telegram three of the four
analyses showed bias in the same direction . As well. each of these
papers omitted a large number of the 35 stories which had been chosen as
important as a result of the questionnaire. (The Evening Telegram
included 65.7% and the Daily News included 48.5%. see Tables 5 and 7 and
Appendix C.)
If a teacher used either of these papers for instructional pur-
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poses, some of the information necessary to understand either side's
point of view voukd probably be missing. Therefore, what happened in
international affairs would in all probability be difficult for average
students to und e r s t an d since cause an d effec t r elat i on s h i ps might not
be r e a d i l y apparent in the events they we ee studying .
In many cases the Daily News and the Evening Telegram appeared
to be concentrating on "hceae interest" stories ; as a result they lacked
space either to deal with basic military. political issues or to help
expand their readers ' knowledge of other c ultures . For example, the
Da i ly News ca rried a s tory entitled "Soldier Marries on Battlefield"
(Daily News , October 12. 19 73, p , 9) which , although of probable interes t
to a few people, would do little to further knowledge of the Middle
East. Another article in the Daily News was supposed to be about the
difficulty of becoming a liberated woman in Cairo (Daily News , November
8 , 1973 , p , 5). It went on to describe an Egyptian woman who was com-
pletely atypical of Muslim c ulture . As a result , it might be concluded
that students reading these papers would learn little to gene rate empa thy
toward other cultures.
Without sufficient information students would find it difficult
as well to make logical political choices based on rational thinking .
A student cannot consider the relative merits of each side when he or
she does not have sufficient information to understand the controversy.
Discussion of Hypotheses 5 and 7
Although the first hypothesis was not statistically supported
(that the papers analyzed would show similar bias to each other), there
was a tendency towards this conclusion since 11 of the 12 eaasu rea showed
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bias in the same direction. The second (that each individual paper
tended to show bias in the same direction on each analysis used) was
supported . The implications of these findings for the classroom teacher
would appear to be that in international events. many of the newspapers
they see will probably show similar bias to each other. Consequently.
the only defence for this type of overwhelming influence would appear
to be to teach students methods by which they can detect biased report-
Ing. If they are aware a report is biased, they can at least look to
other sources of information to find another point of view .
Discussion of Hypothesis 6
Although the sample was too small to make a definite conclusion,
and the results were not always statistically significant, the sample
newspapers tended to show similar bias to that which has been found to
occur in the American press. This result coupled with other studies
(which have been reviewed) implies that Canadian newspapers do not
"reflect the kind of bias that Canadians tend to share;" yet the Report
of the Special Senate Committee on Mass Media (p , 234) contends they
should. This means that the view of the outside world Canadians are
receiving is not necessarily in keeping with any Canadian philosophy.
As a result, one opportunity for Canadians to develop a consistent atti-
tude towards the outside world, in keeping with Canada's pluralistic.
multi-cultural view of society, is apparently lost. Although it is not
possible to discuss. as a result of the analyses, how well the press has
presented the various sectors of Canadian society. it is possible to
point out that the view Canadians are receiving of the outside world is
perhaps more in keeping with American social philosophy than Canadian.
.3
Usefulness o f Newspapers
As a result of considering eac h of the hypotheses , considering
the four instructional aims a nd of considering the results of the study,
it would appear that a teacher could not expect to instruct students in
controversial current events using a SINGLE newspaper as FACTUAL re -
source material.
However, the stress in the above statement is on " s i n g l e" and
" f a c t ual. " Although it seems to be reasonable to expect a newspaper to
cover any event thoroughly (for this reason , there seems to be evidence
that the Daily News and the Evening Telegram are of little value in
studying international affairs), it does not appear to be a human char-
acteristic to be without bias. As the coders who were picking the
important events pointed out: " i mpo r tan t from which point of view? "
choosing news stories to print or from what point of view to wri te them ,
i n d i v i d ual human beings are making judgments , and can reasonably be
expected to show bias in arriving at their conc lusions. As a result, the
ideal situation for teaching controversia l current events would seem to
be when the " numbe r and variety of newspapers give an opportunity for all
i mpo r t a n t points of view to be expressed" (Royal Commission on the Press,
1947-1949) .
Since many schools cannot afford to purchase l a r g e numbers of n ews-
papers, there are two possible ways the difficulty of bias can be over-
These will be discussed at some length .
Methods of Improvement
The two basic methods of improvement would seem to be either to
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look for sources of material outside the school and/or to teach students
to recognize cases of biased reporting when they observe them.
Utilization of Outside Services
One method to improve a school's coverage of international and
national events would be to give students access to news gathering
services such as Keesing I s Contemporary Archives . Facts on File. and
Canadian News Facts. These sources give quotes from various newspapers
in order to ensure coverage of all aspects of an event; however, their
cost makes them prohibitive for individual schools to purchase. If a
school were a member of a large school board, the district resource
office could subscribe to these services. Teachers would then have
access to them for preparing lessons in current events . If a school
does not have the advantage of a district resource office , a request
can be placed with the public library service to obtain clippings from
various sources on questions which are being discussed in the classroom.
Public libraries are quite willing to provide this service.
Methods of Implanting Bias
Another ee tbod which can be employed is to help students to
understand that a newspaper can be biased , and to help them to recognize
instances of bias. Once they are aware of methods of implanting bias,
they are less likely to accept biased reports as factuaL
First, a teacher could give the students the list of propaganda
themes noted in Appendix A. These themes could be adapted with little
difficulty to various situations . The teacher could assign the students
the project of finding instances of usage of these themes in magazines
and newspapers which they ccemcnfy utilize in studying current events .
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Secondly. a teacher could ask students to utilize some of the
IlIethods employed during this study to detect bias. It would not be
necessary for a student to become involved in the tedious procedure of
measuring column-inches In an article or points in a headline. They
could, however, be asked to read a paper carefully, searching for
examples of the methods of implanting bias. These methods wIll be
listed briefly a Long with activities which might help students to detect
cases where they have been employed.
Bias in Newspaper Sources. Students could run a simple check. on
the datelines of news articles to see with which wire service and in
which location an item originated.
Bias through Selection and Omission. Students could take issues
of such magazines as Macleans, Time, and Newsweek, and make a list of
important events in some news story, assign the events direction, and
then check the Daily News and the Evening Telegram to see if they have
included all these events in detail.
Bias through Placement. Students could run a simple check
during an election campaign and see which party or candidate is receiving
most front page coverage.
Bias through Coincidental Placement. Students could see if
there are examples of cceeenee by one candidate followed by remarks
vhich discredit what he or she has said. They could also look at pic-
tures to see if the candidate has been shown talking to someone ....ho does
not have a good public image.
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Bias through Words . Students could study headlines, looking for
usage of words with favourable (unfavourable) connotations to describe
participants in a controversy.
Bias in News Images. Students could check a particular person
who receives a lot of press coverage to Bee If a particular image of
that person is being presented by an individual newspaper.
Bias In Photograph Selection and -Captions . Students could check
all the photographs which were presented In a newspaper during a contro-
versy. and using the propaganda themes. see if one side or the other was
receiving favourable (unfavourable) treatment.
Through using a combination of these two methods teachers would
hopefully be ab le to teach students to think critically about written
material which is presented to them through the press.
Implications for Future Studies
As a result of this research there are some questions which have
arisen. These could make informative topics for further research.
First , it would be valuable to conduct a bilingual study. with a
similar design to this study. of a sample of Canadian newspapers to see
if there is a significant difference in the treatment they have given
the Separatist cause in Quebec . (The Canadian Radio Television and
Telecommunication Commission (CRTC) has conducted a study of the cae
French language radio network with a similar purpose to the proposed
cne , ) This type of survey would give Canadians an indication of the
adequacy of newspaper coverage of national news events .
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Secondly, more information about the " agenda setting" role of
the media would seem to be essential. A poll of the type to which
Kartin (1977) refers could be conducted to see if there is any discre-
pancy between what people think the main issue in the next federal
election viII be . and what they think is the greatest problem fadng our
nation today. This study would give some indication of whether the
press and the politicians are placing issues before the public, that the
public does not think are of the first importance .
Thirdly, a new study similar to Scanlon 's (1968 , 1969) cou ld be
conducted to see If American influence on Canadian reporting of inter-
national affairs has decreased.
Fourthly. an instructional package could be developed on reflec-
tive thinking and the decision making process through the study of con-
troversial current events. Newspapers. magazines. radio. and television
could be used as resource materiaL Recogni tion of propaganda themes
and methods of implanting bias as well as the ability to make well-
founded judgments. having been presented with tvc or more sides in a
controversy. could be the objectives.
Concluding Comments
As a c oncluding cceaent , it seems important to res tate that it
appears to be unwise to allOW' students to accept information which they
receive through newspapers as factual. This study has attempted to
point crt , in a measurable way. that much of the material which students
read can be biased or lacking in information essential to understanding
a situation. With the uncertain future that is facing young people
today, it would seem essential for them to develop skills in detecting
propagan da and "double s pe ak, " as well as to develop skills in t h i nk i ng
i n a rational manner . To r e qu o t e Mue ss lg (1975) :
de aling with con t r ove rsial issues is fa r more importan t than
many peopl e in social studies educat ion have yet t o realize .
• • • One cannot p re dict h ow much time i s left t o develop
ref l e c t i ve persons who can a tte mpt t o imp rove t he human con -
di tion an d t o save mank ind, b ut it Is apparent th a t we mus t
be en ga ge d serious ly now i n t his crus a de. (p , 18)
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QUESTIONNAIRE
The Yom Kippur War
Of the following one hundred events of the Yom Kippur War, 1973, please
indicate in RANK ORDER the THIRTY which you b e l i e ve to be most important
by checking ( ). If you believe the event was favourable to the
Israelis. mark it plus (+) ; 1£ you feel it was unfavourable to the
Israelis make it minus (-). If you believe an event was favourable to
the Arabs, mark it minus (-); 1£ you believe it was unfavourable to the
Arabs. mark it plus (+).
The following may be helpful guidelines in determining if events are
favourable or unfavourable :
1. active-passive -- the group Is capable (or incapable) of carrying
out policies advocated; individual leaders are p resented as
active , competent individuals (passive. incompetent).
2 . honest-dishonest -- the I e ade rs or people are shown to have
pe rsonal virtue (or lack of it); e s g , , accusing one side or the
other of attacking civilian populations or mistreating prisoners
of war would be negative.
3. powerful-unpowerful - - the leaders , armed forces, or people are
shown to have high morale, be united. or to be assured of
victory (or the opposite of these).
4. positive va lues-negative values -- leaders , armed forces, or
people are associated with socially approved (or disapproved)
values. e vg , associating one side or the other with Communism or
Communists wou ld be unfavourable. in our social context.
5. strength-weakness -- a statement presenting the leader's position
on an issue or event in conjunction with a favourable (o r
unfavourable) evaluation of the issue or event .
EVENTS. •..
1. Egyptians cross canal at 5 points. overrun the "Bar-Lev" line.
Construct 12 pontoon bridges and bring 400 tanks along the 100 mile
length of the canal. Syrians launch an offensive with 1.400 tanks.
want to recapture the Golan Heights.
2 . Mrs. Meir makes TV broadcast on the attack condemning the Arabs for
attacking on Day of Atonement.
3. Alth ou gh both sides blame each other for the attack , the UN truce
observers on the Suez Canal and the Go l a n Heights report t h a t the
ceasefire lines in both a reas had been initially corased by the
Egyptian and Syrian troops.
79
4. Size of forces entering the war. The combined Arab forces greatly
outnumbering the Israeli.
5. Tass agency USSR gives a pro-Arab report . Said the blame for the
attack lay wholly with Israel, condemned extreme reactionary circles
which have constantly encouraged Israel in its aggressive ambition,
and spoke of the l e gi t i ma t e rights of the Arab people of Palestine.
The West felt the statement was moderate since it did not support
Syrian and Egyptian claims that Israel started the war.
6. Egypt announced they held the whole length of the east bank of the
Suez Canal in Egyptian hands . They said they had reoccupied Qantara
(Kantara) , heavy losses inflicted on Israelis and a number of
prisoners taken. They claimed to be " pou r i n g" into the Sinai with
" de s pe r a t e " resistance by Israelis. Syrians drove more than 15
miles into Israeli-occupied territory , recapturing Quneitra (Kunei-
tra) , advanced across Golan Heights toward Israel Proper.
7. The Security Council he ld inconclusive meetings on October 8 and 9.
Both sides and their allies making conflict ing statements.
8 . Damascus was bombed . There were a number of civilian casualties,
particularly in a part of the capital where there were many foreign
embasies. The Norwegian UN observer and his wife were among these.
9. Mr . Brezhnev, of the USSR, sent a l e t t e r to President Boumedienne in
Algiers saying to "use all means at their disposal and take all
steps required with a view to supporting Egypt and Syria."
10 . A correspondent with Israeli Army said Israel was engaged in "one of
the most bitter battles in its history."
11. Aharon Yariv said Israeli forces had evacuated the Bar-Lev line and
established a " f i rm base for operation--2 or 3 miles and in some
places 4 miles east of the Suez." He said the situation would not be
easily redressed and there was still a lot of fighting and that "it
is not going to be a short war ."
12. Big air battles were fought over the Golan Heights and Is raeli
Forces bombed Damascus (in retaliation for Syrian rocket attacks
which caused damage to I s r ae li Kibutzim in Upper OaLf Lf e , and an
undisclosed number of civilian casualities) . In the attack on
Damascus , carried out by Phantom jets, Israeli planes scored direct
hits on the Syrian Ministry of Defence and headquarters of Syrian
radio. Damascus airport and the town of Homs were also attacked as
well as a radar station in Lebanon .
13. Egypt 's ability to take and hold bridgeheads in Israeli occupied
Sinai, growing cooperation between Arab capitals, and a new grounds-
well support from Africa, Asia , and Latin America have caused a
powershtft in the Middle East .
14. Mrs. Heir announced on Octobe r 10 that the Golan Heights were
entirely in Israeli hands and that the Syrian army was driven back
80
into Syrian territory .
15. Accor ding to eye-witness r ep o r t s, air-to-air sp a r r ow an d Sidewinde r
missiles were loaded i nto a Boeing 70 7 with painted ove r Israeli
markings on October 10 a t Oceana Naval Air-Station near Norfo lk ,
Va. (Christian Science Monitor).
16. Hr. McClosky , a us State Department spokesman , said that the USSR
had sent "very big tonages of military supplies" to Egypt and Syria--
that these "massive" supplies tend to put a new face on the situa-
tion.
17. Dr. Walkham issued a s tateme nt on October 11 ur g in g t he nations
e nga ge d i n the Middle Eas t confl ict "to cons i der a lternative co urses
before i t Is t oo l ate, 80 t ha t figh ting an d bloodshed may cease."
That p a rties involve d should "redouble their effor ts t o seek an end
t o the fighting and r e s ump t i on of the quest for a just and lasting
settlement in the KiddIe East."
18 . The Syrian Artrl'J had been driven behind the '67 ceasefi re line in all
areas and Israeli t roops and a rmour had pene trated some six mi les
into Syria p rope r, encountering st rong resistance. I n Te l Aviv ,
whe re i t was claimed Isr ae li Army wa s abou t 35 miles from Damascus ,
Kr. Day a n said, " The Sy ri ans will fi nd t hat the distance from
DIlIl18SCUS to Tel Aviv is the same as f rom Tel Aviv to Damascus." As
well, there we re bombing attacks on Damascus airport and other
targe ts and Israeli gunboats hit oil facilities at Banias and
Ta tkia.
19 . Senator Fulbright of the Senate Fore ign Relations Committee pointed
out t h e US governmen t is no t capab le of cu t ting supplies to Is rael
because the Is raelis cont ro l the po licies of t he Cong ress and the
Senate- -He sa i d , "T he e motiona l an d po l i t ica l ties a re too s t rong,
I have witnessed that. I can speak from my own expe rience in the
Senate . "
20 . There we re cont inuing naval encounters between Israeli and Egypt ian
naval units , including one in which a Greek f reigh ter was hit and
sunk, as well as a 12,000 ton Soviet merchant vessel, both by
Israelis .
2 1. Egyp ti an forces launch ed an offensive eastwar d i nto t h e Sinai al ong
the whole IOO-mi le f ro n t . They we re heading fo r t h e t hree passes
(the Kil ta, t he Giddor, and t h e Kha tmia) to the Bir Glfgafa a rea
which was Is rael's main defensive position i n the Sinai. Both sides
had heavy losses in men and materials.
22. Jordan and Saudia Arabia enter the war; although Jordan did not open
a third front. Ins tead, Jordan sent troops to Sy ria to fight.
23. Repo r ts i n Tel Aviv on October 13- 14 said the Lybian Mi rage jets
s upp lie d by Franc e were see n with t he Egyptian Ai r Fo rce. Al though
this was denied by Lybia and this denial was a c ce p t e d by France, the
Is raelis claimed to have shot down two of them.
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24. Israel claimed a IIl&jar victory ove r the Iraq i forces fighting beside
the Syrians . In a great t an k ba tt le 2 Iraq i armou red brigades with
aome 250 tanks were eliminated as an effect ive figh ting force . This
was claimed by t h e Is raeli Military COIllIland: as well 88 an at tack on
Saassaa (Sasa). the main Syrian defensive position covering ueaascus ,
25. US had begun an "appreciable airlift of IIl1litary supplies" to Israel
to offset "massive" Sovie t Ai rlif t . To prevent Soviet airlift f r olll
"unsettling the mili tary balance in t h e area ." Wash ington estimated
tha t since Octobe r 10 . the USSR h ad airlifted 400 tons to Egypt and
Syria .
26. President Sadat addressed People's Assembly in Cai ro. He says the
sole co ndition fo r cease fire was comple te withdrawal by I srae l frOtll
Arab Te r r i tories occupied in the 196 7 var • Describes cross ing of
the Suez as " a mi racle a t any military l ev el. " He s aid Egypt h a d
gr ou n d-to-ground missi les whf ch cou l d cross Si nai and r each heart-
l and o f Is r ael. Five points of Egypt 's "theory of peace" addres s e d
t o Presiden t Nixon :
1) recovery of "occupied lands" an d l e gi t i mat e r i ght s of Pa lestin-
ians .
2) acceptance of ceeee f Lr e and iUllllediate and complete vi t h dr aval of
Is rae l t o p re- '67 bo rde rs.
3) attending a peace conference of all pa rties including Palestin-
ians a t the UN.
4) r e a di ne s s to reopen the Suez Canal. initial steps underway.
5) did no t vent "vague promises" but vented "clarity of intention
and t argets . "
27 . Israeli task fo rce made majo r incursion on the ves t bank i n Centra l
Sector be rveen Great Bitte r Lake a nd I s mai l i a . A statemen t t o that
effect made in t he KNESSET on t he a fternoon of 16 by Mrs . Mei r .
28. Major General Uni Narkiss said more t an k s ve re being us e d than in
t he British offensive in Alamei n i n 1942 , or the German a t t a ck on
t h e Sovie t Union in 1941. He s aid the Egyp t ian offens ive had been
broug h t to a s t a nds t i ll i n all s ect o rs , and vas making little or no
he a dway . Israeli tank s and a r mour we r e t aking a h e avy toll. Briga-
dier Herzog - -chief mili tary spokesma n and ana lyst--confi rme d one of
t he bigges t tank battles in hiatory t ak ing place--b igges t since
World War II.
29. Ten member states of OAPEC decided t o r e duce produc tion of petrol by
at l e ast 5% progressively each month with effect from Octobe r , on
the basis of the p rece di n g month's production. until Is raeli forces
had vithdrawn completely froll. territories occupied in June 196 7 var
and legal rights of Palestinians had been restored .
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30. Mrs. Heir denounced "criminal war" in Knesset, launched by Syria and
Egypt on the holiest day of Jewish calendar . She said it was a war
for "very existence of Israel and of the Jewish people." She said
Israel's forces were operating on the west bank of tbe Suez and that
Syria had been "badly beaten" and driven back . She spoke of the
"sinister role" of the Soviet Union. She contrasted A1Ilerican action
to that of other "enlightened countries," Le •• Britain for cutting
weapons to both sides and France for permitting Lybia to use Mirage
fighters on the Egyptian front.
31. President Sadat assumed personal command of the Egyptian army. He
said special JIHAD (holy war) measures were passed by the Egyptian
Parliament--including: wide range of taxes. gradual increases in
income taxes. cOlllpulaory savings. and increased price for petrol.
32. President Nixon requested $2 ,200 million in immediate military aid
for Israel to prevent "substantial inbalance" of Plilitary power.
33. Major General Mucktar adPlitted that "strong" Israeli forces had
crossed the Canal--however, he continued to claim that they were
surrounded.
34. Major General Mucktar claimed that Israeli losses in the Siani were
very high, over 300 aircraft, 600 tanks, 400 half-tracks, and other
aIlllOured vehicles, 25 helicopters, in addition to 25 naval vessels.
He said their death toll was 3,000 up to the outset of the tank
battle alone.
35 . Israeli tanks continued to pour over the Suez canal e::r:panding their
bridgehead, "taking out" many of the missile sites on the west bank.
According to Israeli correspondents at the front almost all SAM
missile sites had been knocked out by October 21. The Israeli Air
Force, according to Israeli sources, had virtually co~lete control
of the skies on both aides of the canal.
36. Israel claimed to have destroyed about 850 Egyptian tanks since the
start of the war and to have shot down 210 Egyptian planes.
37. The Security Council adopted a resolution presented jointly by US
and USSR calling for a ceasefire in the Middle East. It was adopted
14 to nil W'ith China abstaining. It was worded as follows:
The Security Council :
a) calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all
fighting and teminate all military activity immediately, no
later 'than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of the
decision in the positions they now occupy.
b) calls upon all parties concerned to start illllllediately after the
ceasefire, the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242
in all its parts.
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c) decides that immediately and concurrently with the ceaseflre,
negotiations start between parties concerned under the appro-
priate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace .
38. rereet wanted an end to the Arab blockade of the Straits of Bal-el-
Mandeb imposed by the Egyptian Navy. The Israeli cabinet accepted
the ceasefire after a 4-hour debate. Egyptian acceptance was
announced one hour later, although this was on the condition that
Israel adhere to it. Cairo interpreted the resolution to !!lean that
Israeli forces 1II.ust withdraw il!ll:1ediately from the current ceasefire
line 8S well as from territory occupied since 1967. Iraq announced
it would not be a party to any resolution, procedure . or measure in
aIlllistice or ceasefire negotiations with Israel. now or in the
future .
39 . At the time of the first ceasefire on October 22: an estimated
12.000 Israeli troops with 200 tanks were holding a b ridgehesd west
of the Suez running for 30 miles to the north and south of the Great
Bitter Lake and about 200 mile s inland leaving some 500 sq. miles of
Egyptian territory in Israeli hands. The important Cairo-Ismailia
road had been cut thereby seriously jeopardizing one of the main
Egyptian supply routes between Cairo and the front, though alterna-
tive routes were available farther north. Although Egyptians were
holding some 400 to 450 sq. miles of territory in Sinai--i.e •• east
of the canal. at the ceasrf Lre , the Egyptian Third Army had , as
stated, been encircled in the southern sector near the town of Suez .
Moreover, by reaching the port of Adabigu south of Suez, the Israelis
had severed all road cODlll.unication between Suez and Cairo.
40. Egypt announced that it approved ceasefire but only if Israel
adhered to it. Cairo interpreted the resolution at the UN to mean
that Israeli forces IIlUst withdraw ilIlll:Mi!diately frolll the current
ceasefire line ae well as fr01ll occupied territory held since 1967 .
41. Security Council met in emergency session on 23rd at the request of
the US and USSR. A new ceasefire resolution (339 of 1973) was
passed 14 to n11 (China abstaining). It stated :
a) ccnfLrtaa its decision on the immediate cessation of all kinds of
firing and all military actions. and urges that the forces ••••
b) requests Secretary General to take measures ••• •
42. Mr. Malik, the Russian representative , accused Israel of having , he
alleged, used truce violations to improve its military position on
the Suez front.
43. Dr. Waldheim announced Syria would obey the ceasefire resolution of
October 22. The Syrians said their acceptance was conditional on
Israeli withdrawal f rom occupied territories (1967) and the protec-
tion of "the legitill8te rights of the Palestinians ."
44. Mrs. Heir explains acceptance of ceasefire to a special session of
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the Knesset on Octobe r 23. Three reasons for I s r ae l i compliance
were named. Two points Israel considered essential for peace:
a) pe ace must be achieved thro ugh direct ne gotiations between
Israel and Arabs .
b ) borders must be negotiated by parties co n cerned.
45 . By Oc t obe r 24 the Israelis had occup i ed the whole Gol an Hei gh t s ,
driven deeply into Sy ri a , ad vanced to within 20 IlliIes o f Syr ia
proper. In the hours before the ceasefire on the Northern front the
Israelis obtained an important success by recapturing the 9 ,000 foot
Mount Hermon . which dominated the Damascus r o ad and had been taken
by the Syrians ea rly in their offensive. Regained the lsst of the
posi tions lost to Syrians at the outbreak of the war.
46. Israel announced it p l anne d t o supply plasma to the t rapped Egyp t i an
troops through the Red Cr os s and said the IDen were in no i_diate
danger dying of t.hirst or hunger. Israel had cut their wa t e r pipe-
line to the eastern bank . It was bel i eved the Egyp tian f orce had
water tank trucks and food .
47 . Israelis claimed to capture Adabiya , 10 miles south of Suez . This
placed them 30 mi les inside Egyp t cont rolling t e r rit ory f rom t h e
outskirts of Ismailia to Adabiya - -about one -half the length of the
Suez Canal.
48 . New Yor k TilDeS r e port e d Oc t obe r 24 that US was h ampered in sending
eh fpee n ta t o Israel because Eu r ope a n na t i on s woul d not pellllit the
us e of t he ir bases as s t opove rs , e s g • • Gr e e ce . Turke y, Spain and
Italy publically took this stand. It was felt that England did
privat e ly point out mili tary a id was being given t o Greece , Turkey .
and Sp ain so t ha t t h ey co uld he lp ou t in a c ris is situation in t he
Mi d dl e East.
49 . J us t i ce Mi nis t e r Sh ap i r i o called for resignat i on of Defence Minister
Daya n because of h is fa i l u r e to interpret correctly evidence of war.
50 . The n i ght of Oc t obe r 25 the Se cur i ty Counc i l adopted ano the r r e s o l u-
tion for t he creation o f a UN E1Iler gen cy fo rce made up of nei ther of
the permanent members of the Securi ty Council. It also repeated two
earlie r resol utions.
51. Dr . Kissinger gave a detailed press conference telling of develop-
ments in Middle East. and contacts be twe e n the US and the USSR to
bring it to an end . He emphasized US does not favour and would not
approve the sending of joint US Sov i e t forces into the Middle East.
That it was " un co nc e i vab l e that we sh ould transplant the great power
r i valry into the Middle East" or " i mpos e a military settlement by
the US and USSR and that the USA was "even IIK)re opposed to the
uni lateral introduction by any great power , especially a Nuclear
Power of mi litary forces i nto the Mid dle Eas t in wha tever guise
these forces should be i ntrodu ce d." Disclosed President Nixon had
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ordered "certain precautionary measures" to be taken by US--a refer-
ence to a world-wide lllilitary alert of US forces, to which President
Nixon referred next day. He said "the conditions that produced the
war were clearly intolerable to the Arab nations , and the US was
prepared "to lend Its diplomatic weight both bilaterally and
unilaterally" to seek a solution "just to all sides ." He said that
Israel in Security Council Resolution 338 had "been given an oppor-
tunity for the negotiations it had sought for all its existence."
and it must be ready for a just and durable peace.
52. President Nixon in a press conference disclosed that prior to the
Security Council's resolution of October 24, a "potentially explo-
sive crisis" had arisen as a result of information .•.• " Dr. James
Schlesinger, US Defence Secretsry had given three reasons for Presi-
dent Nixon's decision for Ill1litary alert:
a) the altering of Soviet paratroops in East Europe.
b) doubling in size of the Russian fleet in the Mediterranian Sea
to over SOO ships.
c) the apparant preparation of Soviet aircraft, including large
transport planes.
53. Addressing a "World Congress of Peace Forces" in Moscow on October
26. Mr. Brezhnev spoke of "certain elements" in the NATO countries
which in recent days had "artific:1ally fanned passions by all kinds
of fantastic rumours about the intentions of the USSR in the Kiddle
East." Accused the US of "artificially drumming up" of s crisis to
justify its world-wide military alert October 25. Said the USSR had
sent men to observe the ceasefire and hoped us would do the same.
54. A plan drawn up by Dr. Waldheim for a 7.00D-man UN force to serve in
the Middle East for an initial 6-1IlOnth period was approved in the
Security Counc:11 by 1,400 votes to nil, with China abstaining. Hain
tssks--to supervise a full ceasefire on the Suez Canal front, to
ensure a return to the positions held by both sides at 16:50 hours
GMT on October 22 when original truce came into effect. TeIlllS:
a) selection of contingents.
b) act impartially.
c) enjoy freedom of movement. armed wi t h defensive weapons used in
self-defence including resistance to attempts to carry out its
duty.
d) cceeende r appointed by Secretary General in agreement with
Security Council and responsible to Secretary General; cost
$30.000.000 for six month period.
55. Egypt and Isrseli officers met (the first meeting since 1956)
arrange details of convoy to enc:1rcled Egyptian Third Army .
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56. DelllOnstrations in Tel Aviv entered their third consecutive day on
Oc t obe r 31. They demanded a strong government position on prisoner
return and opposed resupply of Third Army.
57. Canada accepts request from Waldheim to provide logistic support.
58. Statement b y International CoDDit t e e of the Red CrOSB asked for list
of prisoners of war. authorization to visit them. " ••• it
received a positive reply from Israel, but no response from Syria.
Egypt gave liat of 46 names to ICRC and single visit was Made to
wounded about ten days ago has constituted a first step not followed
by further action. It deplores that wounded prisoners should be
deprived of protection and assistance afforded by the conventions
which are not subject to any condition of reciprocal treatment and
forbid ee aaurea of reprisal," "to put into practice without restric-
tion or delay the undertakings they have assumed from the respect
and safeguard of human persons."
59. Nixon advised Congress to delay conside ration of the lllOst-favoured-
nation status for the Soviet Union, until the situation in the
Middle East was tlIOre settled. Also deny US credit and credit guar-
antees to nations restric ting Jewish emigration.
60. Dr. Kissinger eec in Washington on October 29-30 with Mr . FahlllY to
attempt to bring the two sides closer to direct negotiations for
pellll8nent settlement of the Middle East conflict.
61. Ske1k Ali Kha1ifa el-Sabah, head of price commission of OPEC said
Arabs feared the US might resort to udli tary IllOves to assure con-
tinued deliveries of Arab 011.
62. Sadat held press conference. Said he was not prepared to enter into
direct talks as auch with Israelis; he was willing to take pa rt in
an international conference in which Palestinians must participate
as soon as Israel withdrew to the first ceasefire line established
under the Security Council' 8 October 22 resolution. Denies Third
ArutY cotllPletely cut off. Could wipe out Israelis with two divisions
of Third Army and attack those on West Bank with First Army. Reveals
Mr. Heath sent message four days before aaying Israelis would
"release" Third Army 1f Egypt lifted naval blockade of the Straits
of Bab-el-Mandeb. To this Sadat replied that Israel should first
respect Security Council 's October 22 r e s o l u t i on , and return to
o riginal ceasefire line.
63. Syrian authorities accused Israelis of shelling civilian buildings
and factories, of throwing time bombs into civilian areas, of
expelling thousands of Syrian villagers, and of forcing Syrian
prisoners of war to march ahead through mine fields. Also of
violating the 1949 Geneva Convention on the protection of war vic-
til:lS. Israel IllUSt return Syrians expelled from villages occupied
duz-Lng the recent fighting and must return the bodies of Syrians
killed.
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64. Hore than BOO Swedish. Finish, Austrian, and Irish troops, etecec
all from UN peace Keeping Force in Cyprus. had been flown to Egypt.
Many by the RAF and deployed to the Egyptian-Israeli front. Further
reinforcements from these four countries were expected to bring
total to 2,000 early in November, that Canada had agreed to provide
"logistical component" of the UN force and that General Ensio
Silssvico of Finland had been appointed C01lDander of the UN Force.
with his headquarters provisionally in Cairo.
65. The International Conmittee of the Red CrOBS:
a) called upon the Egyptian ceverreene to enable it to repatriate
the wounded POW's and to visit POW's held in Egypt, to provide
POW lists not yet supplied.
b) called upon the Government of Israel to enable it to repatriate
wounded POW's and ensure evacuation of wounded from Sinai and
Suez areas, and to fulfill the duties laid upon it in the newly
occupied areas.
c) called upon the Syrian Government to enable it to repatriate
wounded POW's and to visit POW's held in Syria and provide lists
of POW's held. (Geneva Convention: 1) conditions of wounded, 2)
protection of POW's, 3) protection of civilians in occupied
territories)
66. Mrs. Meir stated in Washington that she had never heard of plans to
relieve Egyptian Third Art:1:f. that she would not return to the cease-
fire line. that nobody could place definitely. would not give any
territory for a Palestinian State located between Israel and Jordan.
But was ready for peace talks without pre-conditions.
67. Security Council decided to enlarge Emergency Force by getting addi-
tional states: Ghana. Indonesia. Nepal. Panama. Peru. Poland. and
Canada--the latter two with regard to logistic support--and it was
further agreed that two more African countries, not yet designated
should also be approached.
68. Egypt, Syria. and Saudi Arabia have agreed on joint political stand
on peace efforts, but the two main Arab combatants have drawn up
contingency plans should ceasefire deadlock persist. Result of
meeting between President sedee , King Fisal and President Assad to
prepare for the Arab front for the visit of Dr. Kissinger.
69. Meeting of DAPEe implementing extra 5% cutback for November to be
increased in December by further 5%. The Algerian minister and
Saudi Arabian minister to visit Western capitals in order to explain
Arab view , including complete embargoes to US and Netherlands.
70. Libyan officials denounced Soviet support of the truce and assailed
Moscow for permitting the continued emigration of Soviet Jews to
IsraeL
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71. Foreign Ministers of nine member countries of ECM met on November
5-6 (Le•• immediately after Arab 011 Ministers bad met in Kuwait)
to consider both the political and economic implications of the war.
Called for both sides in the war to return immediately to the posi-
tion occupied on October 22 (Le• • after first ceasefire--in order
"to facilitate a solution to other pressing problems concerning
prisoners of war and the Egyptian Third Army ," and to Israel to end
the territorial occupation which it had maintained since 1967. and
recognize that any settlement must take account of the "legitimate
rights of the Palestinians." The resolution was regarded generally
as placatory towards Arabs and aroused strong criticism in Israel.
72. The first official figures of Israeli casualties. said on November 6
by the Israeli General Staff. said that a total of 1.850 wounded
were still in hospital. The number of soldiers missing or believed
to be held in Arab captivity wss about 450. though precise figures
could not be given as Egypt and Syria had not made POW11sts avail-
able to the International Red Cross. No figures of Egyptian and
Syrian casualties had been published in Cairo or Damascus by the
first week of November.
73 . Dr. Kissinger was in Cairo for talks with President Sada t , which
according to press reports were of a very cordial nature; while he
was in Cairo it was announced that the US and Egypt had agreed to
resume full diplomatic relations for the first ti1lle since the 1967
war. and Dr. Kissinger told press that "I think ve are moving towards
peace."
74. It was officially disclosed that the US had reached a formula with
Egypt and Israel fo r ce aae fd re , It was hoped it would lead to
lasting settlement. It was believed. though not officially stated.
that the proposals had been brought by Kissinger. The agreement
would be submitted to UN before it was published .
75. A six point ceasefire agreement negotiated during Kissinger's mission
in the Middle East and accepted by both Egypt and Israel was signed
on November 11 by EBYPtian Major General MohaI:lllled Abdel GhaIll)' el-
Gamasy and Israeli Major General Aharon Yar Iv , in the presence of
General Silasvuo . the cceaende r of the UN Emergency Force. Both
sides became deadlocked in a controversy over control of check
points on the Cairo-Suez road--vital for the supply of the Third
Army. The text of t h e agreement h a d been made public in a letter
from Dr. Kissinger to Dr. Waldheim dated November 9. as follows:
1) Both agree to observe ceasefire called for by Security Council.
2) Both agree discussion will begin illlllediately to settle question
of return to October 22 position in framework of agreement on
the disengagement and separation of forces under the auspices of
the United Nations.
3) Town of Suez receive daily food. water. and medicine . All
wounded civilians evacuated .
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4) Shall be no impediment to movement of non-military supplies to
the east bank .
5) I9raell check poInts on the Cairo-Suez road wIll be replaced by
UN check points. At Suez . Israeli officers can participate with
UN to supervise the non-military nature of cargo.
6) UN check points established. there will be exchange of prisoners
of war. including wounded.
This was the fi rst majo r agreement between Israel and an Arab
country since armistice agreements which ended Palestine War 1948-
1949 was signed at the Kilometer 101 check point , in a UN tent set
up in a IOO- mi l e strip of "no-man's" land.
76. Two-level investigation of the conduct of war was ordered in Israel:
1) political decision, and 2) mili t ary aspects.
77. Mrs. Heir met with world socialist leaders in London i n an effort to
muster support for her government. Deno unced the November 6 state-
ment of the EEC foreign ministers. West German Chancellor Wil ly
Brandt said to have r e plie d that i t went no fu rther than t he UN
Security Council resolution 242.
78. Finish UNEF forces became engaged in a fist fight with Israeli
soldiers on November 12 after Fins established two check points at
Kilometer 101 and Kilometer 119 , just outside Suez . Fins took over
after another meeting between Israel and Egypt ended in disagreement.
Finish commander said Israeli cceeender invaded Kilomete r 119 and
threatened to fire if UN did not pull out. Fights erupted . The
tension abated when 60 UNEF replacements arrived but Israelis posi-
tioned other forces just outside check points .
79. Mrs. Heir said Israel will not wi thdraw to first ceasefire positions
and that it still believed in depth and defensible bo rders. There
can be no large scale withdrawal from 1967 occupied territory.
80. It was announced in Beruit that Iraq was not abiding by t h e November
5 decision by Arab oi l produce rs to cu t production by 25%. An
Iraqi government statement warned aga i ns t creation of a general
"shortfall i n s upplies" to all industrial us e r s that might p rovoke
t he " US to l aun ch new military adve ntures i n the Arab r egion. "
81. Following ceasef t r e ag reement a f urthe r ag reement was reached by
senior Egyptian and Israeli officers on Novembe r 14 to begin exchang-
ing prisoners of war as from 7 a.m. on November 15 . beginning with
wounded p risoners. The agreement r e ach e d at Kilomete r 10 1 check
point provided that two International Red Cross aircraft based in
Nicosia would shuttle the exchanged POW's between Egypt and Israel.
Disputed check points on Cairo-Suez r oa d held by Israel would be
handed over to UN control. Since the ceasefire a total of 175 lorry-
loads of supplies had passed through Israeli lines to the town of
Suez and to the Egyptian Third Army. The Third Army to receive
food , water and medicine and wounded to be evacuated.
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82 . Meeting in Vienna on November 18 OAPEC decided to itllplelllent the
next 5% production cut scheduled for December but to exempt all
members of European coumunities (with exception of the Netherlands)
in appreciation of their political stand on November 6 .
83. Ceaseflre talks resueed on Cairo road concerning exchange of POW's
evacuation of dead from the battle field and supplies to Third Army.
84. Dr. Kissinger announced he expected Arab-Israel conference next
month. At the same time he threatened 011 producers with retalia-
tion. He said US wou ld be forced to take countermeasures. would
have to consider retaliatory action if the Arab oil embargo con-
tinued "unreasonably and indefinitely." He said US would not "be
pushed beyond this point by any pressure." He did not: specify what
form ccunce reeeeures would take and if there was a deadline.
85. Dr. Kissinger said. "we have no confirmation that the USSR has
introduced nuclear weapons in Egypt. There are USSR public state-
ments rejecting this accusation." He said. "if USSR were known to
int roduce nuclear weapons into local conflict this would be a funda-
mental shift in traditional practices and one hard to reconcile with
an effort to bring about a responsible solution."
86 . In a statement issued on November 22 and interpreted in the press as
a move to reduce Arab hostility to Japan, the Japanese Government
"deplored" Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories called
on he r to Withdraw. and announced that it would "continue to observe
situation in Middle East with grave concern" and depending on future
developments "may have to reconsider its policy towards Israel."
They cited Resolution 242 of the UN.
87. Dayan said while greeting the last of the Israeli prisoners At LOD
airport that Egyptians may have murdered some captured Israelis . He
said there were Israelis taken by the Egyptians who were not returned.
that they must have been IIlUrdered or died in some other way.
88. The exchange of Israeli and Egyptian prisoners of war was completed
November 22 . Since the start of the repatriation of the POW's
November 15, an airlift supervised by the ICRC had returned 241
Israelis and 8.031 Egyptians. an ICRC official said .
89 . Abba Eban said on November 22 that Damascus must free Israeli pri-
soners before Israel "can sit with Syria at a peace conference." He
said he had discussed details of the proposed parley in Washington
November 21 with Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger.
90. Ahmed Zaki Yamane warned that his country would cut its 011 produc-
tion by 80% if the US. Western Europe. or Japan tried to counter the
Arab oil embargo. To Kissinger's remarks about unspecified Alllerican
reprisals. Yamani said if the US attempted military means, saudi
Arabia would blow up its 011 fields. He cautioned Western Europe
and Japan against joining US in any eove , saying, "your whole
economy will definitely collapse all of a sudden."
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91. Palestinian hyjackers of the Arab Nationalist Youth for the Libera-
tion of Palestine, took over a KLM 747 plane just after it left
Beruit on a stopover between Amsterdam and Tokyo . Demanded that the
airlines halt the transportation of arms to Israel, and that the
Dutch government after its "pro-Israeli" stance and cease providing
mediation or assistance in the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel.
They threatened to blow up the plane if demands not met . They few
to several cities , finally freeing all their hostages in Dubi,
giving themselves up. They were said by Dubs! officials to be taken
into custody on November 28.
92. King Hussein said he would not attend the Geneva conference if the
Arab slDlllllit meeting designated the FLO as exclusive representatives
of the Palestinians.
93. The Israeli Cabinet announced that it had accepted in principle a US
proposal to attend a peace conference on the Middle East, scheduled
to start in Geneva on December 18. Jordan also agreed in principle
to be present. Israel said: "Upon receipt of an official invitation,
it will be discussed by the Cabinet and a formal decision taken."
94 . The semi-official newspaper Al Ahran reported that President Sadat
would not attend until Israeli forces withdrew to the October 22
ceasefire lines . Syria announced it would not exchange prisoners
with Israel for the present . It said the exchange "will be carried
out only within the framework of a total Israeli withdrawal from
occupied Arab lands ."
95 . Dayan asserted that Israel must insist on retaining former Arab
territories for its security. He said Kissinger's security guaran-
tees could supplement defensible borders but were no substitute for
them . Said Israel must retain Jordan Valley, Golan Heights. radar
installations in Nablus Hill in West Bank . the Gidi and Milta passes
in Sinai and Sharm el She ilk which controlled passage between the
Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba.
96. The heads of 15 Arab states and Palestinian leaders held a suaat t
conference in Staoueli, Algeria to review October war and plan
future Arab strategy. A communique issued November 28 announced an
embargo on oil exports to Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa. It
endorsed "political efforts" towards Middle East peace agreement,
but only on condition that Israel withdraw from all occupied Arab
territories "notably Jerusalem." The conference gave implicit
approval to Egypt's decision to enter into peace negotiations with
Israel. Two "paramount and unchangeable" conditionS to achieve that
end: "evacuation by Israel of the occupied Arab lands, and first of
all Jerusalem, and re-establishment of the fu ll national rights for
Palestinian people ." Qaddafi of Lybia would not attend because
Libya "would be asked to recognize Israel."
97. The conference recognized the PLO headed by Yasir Arafat a~ the sole
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. This was
regarded as a blow to King Hussein who did not attend the confer-
ence. but was represented by Bahjat Talhsuni. head of the King's
Cabinet.
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98. Israeli and Egyptian military negotiations broke off talks at
Kilometer 101 November 29 after reaching an impasse on disengagement
of their forces along the Suez Canal. No date was set for new
meetings . Major General Aharon Yariv repeated proposal that Israeli
forces withdraw to Hitla Pass in Sinai. 20 miles east of the canal
in exchange for an agreement by Egypt to thin its forces.
99 . Lybia closed its embassy in Cairo . The move was an apparent protest
by Qaddafl against Egypt's conduct of the war, its acceptance of the
Arab sU1IlIn1t meeting to endorse peace conference with Israel.
100. Representatives of Saudi Arabia , Ahmed Zaki Yamane, and Algeria ,
Hr. Abdee s.aLem, arrived in US for a week long tour to discuss the
011 weapon.
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1 1 Israel says Arab
tanks trapped 19~ 72 3 + (l5x3) - 19 + (5x72) 368+
2 1 Israel tactical air
power is shield for
build-up of reserves 12~ 24 2 + (l5x2) - 12 + (24x5) 136+
to repel at tacks .
(ecnt , p , 2, Israel
controls air
3 1 Military action by
Egypt see n as move 4Js 24 1 - (l5x1) - 4 + (24x5) 131-
to bring settlement
4 3 Iraqis nationalize
aU coepany interest 22, 24 2 + (l5xl) - 22 + (2416) 12&1-
held by two US firms
5 3 Arab leaders vow
support. but fev 17 24 2 + (15x2) - 17 + (24x5) 133+
offer troops
6 3 UN council divided
informal talks on 22 24 2 0 (l5x2) - 22 + (24x5) 1280
ceasefire call
7 3 Iran and Iraq r es ume
"
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-
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ship
s 5 Jewish community
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10 25 Is raelis remain calm
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day calls to cceeat
APPENDIX E
Study of Pictures and Stories
100
Study of Pictures and Stories
Daily News
October 8, 1973
Picture
" ~ .i ~ ] .<1: 0~ ".1 E
TR
LL
~
~ .~ ~
11"
5"
Story
Middle East war enters second day
Jews have no plans to send ai d to Is rael
October 12 , 1973
5'" 21
4" 18
TR
TR
TR
ML
TL
n,
2"
3
'"
289,
5
3
3
1""
Israel predicting victory in Syria
Seven Newfoundlanders smack .
Pope fears wsr may damage .
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Soviet planes supplying Arabs
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Ferocious bat tIe underway
Cuts oil exports to U. S.
Armies ordered quit shooting
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Peace keeping role again in .
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Work starts on reopening Suez ...
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